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NOTES
TOO MANY CONSONANTS AND NOT ENOUGH
CONSONANCE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE S&L
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
INTRODUCTION
Savings and loan associations ("S&Ls"),' also known as building and
loan associations, homestead associations, cooperative banks and thrift
institutions,2 once handled close to fifty percent of the "mortgage-writing
business" in the United States.3 Yet today the S&L industry is plagued
by infirmity: Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas F. Brady estimated that
over 1,000 S&Ls, about forty percent of the industry, may have to be
seized by the government because they are insolvent or unsound.4
Moreover, the cost of the S&L bailout to the government-and thus to
the taxpayers-could reach $500 billion.- In response to these startling
statistics, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA").6
To understand how FIRREA's provisions will affect the S&L indus-
try,7 it is essential to examine those weaknesses in the industry that have
created the need for this legislation. By understanding the structure and
function of the S&L industry, one can begin to understand the nature of
the S&L crisis, and thus why Congress designed FIRREA as it did. The
structure and function of the S&L industry is best understood by examin-
ing the regulatory legislation that has shaped its development. This ap-
1. The term "S&L" has been subsumed in the term "savings association" under
FIRREA. For a discussion of the terminology, see Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA
Itself: Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50
Ohio St. L.L 1117, 1117 n.2 (1989); see also People ex rel Barrett v. Logan County Bldg.
and Loan Ass'n, 369 M11. 518, 525, 17 N.E.2d 4, 8 (1938) ("Such associations are more
than business corporations; they are quasi-public corporations, chartered to encourage
thrift and promote the ownership of homes, with powers and immunities peculiarly their
own." (citation omitted)(emphasis in original)).
2. See Comment, Banking-Mergers-Is Commercial Banking Still a Distinct Line
of Commerce?, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 958, 960 n. 11(1983). S&Ls were called "thrift institu-
tions" because "they were originally founded to encourage savings among working class
individuals." Id. at 961 n.17.
3. See Yang & Gleckman, The S&L Mess--And How to Fix It, Bus. Wk., Oct. 31,
1988, at 136.
4. See Rosenbaum, A Financial Disaster With Many Culprits, N.Y. Times, June 6,
1990, at D4, col. 1.
5. See Quint, New Estimate on Savings Bailout Says Cost Could Be $500 Billion,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
6. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (to be codified at various sections of 12 and 15
U.S.C.).
7. For a discussion of FIRREA's provisions see Note, Playing With FIRREA, Not
Getting Burned: Statutory Overview of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The
S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S323 (1991).
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proach also gives an overview of FIRREA's legislative history, because
FIRREA was intended to strengthen and amend existing regulations, as
well as to impose additional requirements on the industry.8
This Note focuses on those pieces of S&L legislation that contributed
to the regulatory framework now in existence. This examination reveals
that most major S&L legislation has been reactive,9 designed to cure
already-existing problems in the S&L industry. These regulations were
then left in place to respond to a different financial atmosphere."1
Consequently, S&L legislation has been generally ineffective as a regu-
latory scheme. Whereas regulations are generally intended to prevent
undesirable developments within a particular industry,1I S&L regulations
have merely responded to various crises.12 Moreover, despite the numer-
ous regulations in place, the very goal of these regulations-preventing
widespread failure of S&Ls' 3-has not been achieved.14 Part I of this
Note examines the origins of the S&L industry in the United States and
traces its development from the early 1800s to the Stock Market Crash of
1929 and its immediate aftermath. Part II, covering 1932 to 1950, re-
views the main pieces of S&L regulatory legislation arising from the New
Deal. Part III, covering 1950 to 1959, discusses the challenges to this
regulatory scheme presented by the Mallonee litigation and the legislative
response to this case. Finally, Part IV examines the S&L legislation that
arose-between 1960 and 1969.11 This Note concludes that S&L regula-
tory legislation has historically been unsuccessful because it has been re-
active in nature.
I. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE S&L INDUSTRY
A. The Origins of the S&L Association
The first recorded S&L 16 in the United States, the Oxford Provident,
8. See id. at S324-25.
9. Cf. 3 Documentary History of Banking and Currency in the United States 164
(H. Krooss ed. 1983) ("[Throughout history it had always required a severe panic or a
long depression to persuade lawmakers and public opinion to attempt bank reform.").
10. There are some who contend that the Depression was itself a reaction to already-
existing problems in the banking structure of the time. See White, A Reinterpretation of
the Banking Crisis of 1930, 44 J. Econ. Hist. 119, 120 (1984).
11. See K. Davis, Administrative Law and Government 6-11 (2d ed. 1975).
12. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
13. Malloy, Balancing Public Confidence and Confidentiality: Adjudication Practices
and Procedures of the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, 61 Temp. L. Rev. 723, 726-27
(1988).
14. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
15. See Note, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, in Annual Survey of Financial
Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L.
Rev. S301 (1991), which focuses on the S&L regulatory legislation arising in the 1970s
and 1980s.
16. The first "building society" on record was founded in 1781 in Birmingham, Eng-
land. See F. Ornstein, Savings Banking: An Industry in Change 4 (1985). Building socie-
ties originated in the mining and factory towns that had grown under the impetus of the
British Industrial Revolution. See A. Teck, Mutual Savings Banks and Savings and Loan
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was organized in 1831 in Frankford, Pennsylvania by newly arrived
workers in the town's textile and tanning mills.' Each member of the
S&L paid an initial sum for each share he purchased in the enterprise
and then paid a monthly fee on each share.' When sufficient funds had
been amassed to finance a home, the member offering the highest pre-
nium on repayment was awarded the funds. This process continued until
each member had received and repaid a loan, at which time Oxford Prov-
ident was dissolved and any remaining money was divided among the
members. 19
The idea of the savings association spread" but the federal govern-
ment made no attempt to compile statistics on the S&L industry,2' much
less regulate it.' By contrast, in the 1860s, the federal banking system
was already in place. Specifically, the federal government enacted the
National Bank Act of 1864,23 which established a national banking sys-
tem in addition to the state banking system already in existence.
This Act created within the Treasury Department the office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, which had the power to oversee national
banks.2' In reality, however, the federal banking system "was intended
Associations: Aspects of Growth 18 (1968). As the populations of these towns increased
due to mass migration from farm areas, as well as to increasing birth rates and decreasing
death rates, the demand for housing also increased. See id. The workers' wages allowed
them to finance these homes, and groups of townspeople pooled their earnings into build-
ing societies to enable each member to purchase a home in turn. See id. at 18-20. "Sav-
ings and loan associations in the United States are descended directly from English
building societies .. . ." Id. at 18.
17. See Teck, supra note 16, at 22.
18. See id. at 23.
19. See Ornstein, supra note 16, at 6-7. In 1836, a delegation from Brooklyn, New
York was dispatched to Frankford to observe Oxford Provident. That same year, the
nation's second S&L, the Brooklyn Building and Mutual Loan Association, was formed.
See Teck, supra note 16, at 25.
20. See generally Ornstein, supra note 16, at 7-11 (discussing "Terminating Plan" and
"Permanent Plan" S&Ls); Teck, supra note 16, at 40-42 (describing development of the
installment share, optional share account, and full-paid share as means for S&Ls to ob-
tain funds necessary to make loans. S&Ls began accepting deposits from investors who
did not intend to borrow for home financing purposes).
21. See Teck, supra note 16, at 26. The first industry census was taken in 1888, when
it was calculated that as many as 3,500 S&Ls existed across the nation, providing at least
$300 million for investment. See id.
22. The task of resolving issues in the S&L field thus fell to the judiciary. See, e.g,
Riggs v. Capital Brick Co., 128 F. 491, 491-95 (C.C.D. Conn. 1904)(resolving the ques-
tion of foreclosure by receivers); Interstate Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Badgley, 115 F. 390,
390-93 (C.C.D. Or. 1902)(dealing with mortgage foreclosures).
23. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1865) [hereinafter National Bank Act of 1864]. The "original" national bank act was
Act of February 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665, which was later repealed by the National
Bank Act of 1864, § 62, 13 Stat. at 118.
24. See National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, §§ 1-8, 13 Stat. 99, 99-102. "Although it
is often considered to be a fundamental component of the dual banking system, the Na-
tional Bank Act [of 1864] was intended, at least in part, to hasten the demise of state
banking." Friedman and Friesen, A New Paradigm for Financial Regulation: Getting
From Here to There, 43 Md. L. Rev. 413, 420 (1984)(footnotes omitted).
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to foster a captive market," since each member of the system was obliged
to purchase United States government bonds.25 The federal government
used this captive market to help finance the Civil War,26 and even after
the need for these funds had passed, the dual banking system created
under the Acts remained in place.27 By creating the bifurcated banking
system which is still in existence,2" the National Bank Act of 1864 was in
a sense the precursor of the bifurcated S&L regulatory system.29
By 1892, leaders in the S&L industry had organized the United States
League of Local Building & Loan Associations, which later became the
United States Savings & Loan League.30 In the following year, the
United States Bureau of Labor took its first nationwide poll and esti-
mated that 5,860 S&Ls were in full-time operation across the United
States.3 ' Within the next two decades, the first federal S&L regulatory
legislation appeared3 2 and federal banking legislation continued to
develop.33
B. The Rise and Fall of S&Ls: 1920-1932
The years 1920 to 1929 were crucial in the development of the S&L
system. During this decade, the nation experienced a housing boom,34
and the S&L industry, as a vehicle for home financing, 35 expanded
greatly. S&Ls jumped in number from approximately 8,600 to around
12,000 just before the Stock Market Crash,3 6 and S&Ls provided thirty-
five percent of the mortgages on non-farm residences.37 The prosperity
generally associated with the 1920s, however, took its toll on the S&L
industry.
Towards the end of the decade, S&Ls failed to attract new depositors,
who were using their earnings to speculate on the stock market.
25. 1 M. Malloy, The Corporate Law of Banks, § 1.3.1, at 29-30 (1988)(footnote
omitted).
26. See id. at 30.
27. See I M. Malloy, supra note 25, § 1.3.1, at 28-30.
28. See id. at 30.
29. For a discussion of the bifurcated S&L regulatory system, see infra notes 137-143
and accompanying text.
30. See United States Savings & Loan League, Savings and Loan Fact Book 1955, at
80.
31. See Teck, supra note 16, at 26.
32. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 231, 40 Stat. 1057, 1076 (codified as amended
in 2 U.S.C. §§ 271, 272, 273-277; 19 U.S.C. § 460); see also United States v. Cambridge
Loan and Bldg. Co., 278 U.S. 55, 57-63 (1928)(interpreting the tax exemptions created
under the Revenue Act of 1918).
33. See Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913)(codified at various sections of
12 U.S.C.)(creating, inter alia, the federal reserve bank system and open market opera-
tions as a means of controlling the national money supply).
34. See Teck, supra note 16, at 47.
35. See supra note 1.
36. See J. Ewalt, A Business Reborn: The Savings and Loan Story 1930-1960, at 6
(1962).
37. See id. at 4.
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Problems were compounded as depositors also began actively withdraw-
ing funds from accounts for the same reason.38 In order to reverse this
trend, S&Ls were forced to offer higher interest rates on deposits than
they were receiving on mortgage payments.39
Consequently, during this decade S&Ls adopted the practice of bor-
rowing short-term from commercial banks in order to pay withdrawals
on demand; the S&Ls then repaid the loans from incoming receipts."
When the stock market crashed, however, banks found themselves short
of funds, and called in the short-term loans. S&Ls, unable to pay because
of their own limited reserves, were forced to liquidate to meet the banks'
demands.41 Between 1930 and 1932, depositors panicked in the wake of
these liquidations, and a "run"'42 on deposits eventually led to a banking
crisis.43 In fact, the majority of S&L failures resulted from unsafe lend-
ing and borrowing practices in place before the Depression."
By 1932, with personal savings at negative $600 million and consump-
tion expenditures down $12 billion," economic conditions forced the
government to take action to prevent further deterioration of the finan-
cial industry.
38. See id. at 13-14.
39. See White, A Reinterpretation of the Banking Crisis of 1930, 44 J. Econ. Hist. 119,
128 (1984).
40. See Ewalt, supra note 36, at 15.
41. See id.; White, supra note 39, at 123-27. As one Congressman noted, "[p]resent
conditions have shown that it is dangerous, one might say suicidal, for long-term financ-
ing agencies to depend on short-term advances for their emergency needs." 75 Cong. Rec.
12,612 (1932) (statement of Rep. Hancock).
See also Note, supra note 15, at S303-04, S309-10 (explaining how inflationary pres-
sures in the 1970s raised interest payments on deposits above loan repayments, thus cre-
ating an analogous funds shortage).
S&Ls continued their policy of adapting their business practices to meet then-existing
conditions. See, eg., infra notes 111-122, 150-152, 189-194 and accompanying text
(describing how S&Ls' banking practices were a response to the Depression); infra notes
306-309 and accompanying text (describing additional practices adopted in light of the
S&L crisis of the 1960s).
42. If depositors suspect for any reason (unfounded or not) that a bank lacks
sufficient reserves to satisfy its obligations to depositors and might fail, they will
immediately withdraw their deposits. The bank loses reserves and is even more
vulnerable to future deposit outflows. Other depositors who see this happening
will begin to question the bank's health and withdraw their funds too. The
more depositors withdraw funds, the fewer reserves the bank will have and the
more likely it is to fail. The likelier it is to fail, the more likely depositors will
show to withdraw their deposits. This snowballing process, called a "run on the
bank," usually terminates with the failure of the bank unless something can be
done to restore the public's confidence.
F. Mishkin, The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets 310 (1986).
43. At this time, S&Ls adopted the practice of "putting customers on notice," i.e.,
paying out withdrawals only as money flowed into the institution. See Ewalt, supra note
36, at 14-15.
44. See id. at 15, 18.
45. United States Savings & Loan League, Savings and Loan Fact Book 1955, at 9
(table 1).
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II. 1932-1950: THE NEW DEAL LEGISLATION
A. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act
Congress passed the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act ("RFC
Act")' primarily as an interim device4 7 to enable farmers to obtain loans
for 1932 crop production.48 In addition, the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation ("RFC"), created by the RFC Act, was originally intended
to deal with businesses and especially with commercial banks.4 9 Con-
gress did not intend for S&Ls to fall within the RFC Act's coverage.
Based partly on a United States Savings & Loan League survey of S&Ls'
credit needs, however, Congress decided to extend RFC loans to S&Ls as
well.5 0
Because it served as the structural prototype for the Federal Home
Loan Bank system,51 the RFC Act is particularly significant for its struc-
ture. Congress created the RFC for a ten year period,52 and gave it other
powers relating to its functions as a corporation.53 Management of the
RFC was entrusted to a Board of Directors including the Secretary of the
Treasury, the governor of the Federal Reserve Board, and the Farm
Loan Commissioner as members ex officio.54 In addition, the Act pro-
vided for four full-time members chosen by the President of the United
States and subject to Senate approval." The Act provided that not more
46. Ch. 8, 47 Stat. 5 (1932).
47. See Ewalt, supra note 36, at 34 ("The RFC was ... designed for temporary life;
estimates pointed to five, or at most 10, years for its activity.").
48. The Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to expend money "for the purpose of
making loans or advances to farmers in the several States of the United States in cases
where he [found] that an emergency exist[ed] as a result of which farmers [were] unable
to obtain loans for crop production during the year 1932.. . ." Reconstruction Finance
Corporation Act [hereinafter RFC Act], ch. 8, § 2, 47 Stat. 5 (1932).
49. See Ewalt, supra note 36, at 34.
50. See id. at 34-35.
Savings and loan associations would probably not have become eligible for RFC
loans in the ordinary course of events .... [Tihe RFC's need to get started
pouring out financial succor was so insistent that a savings and loan program
might have been sidetracked indefinitely if leaders of the business had not been
on hand in Washington to see that the technicalities were worked out for a swift
utilization of funds by the associations.
Id.
51. See 75 Cong. Rec. 12,609 (1932); see also infra notes 88-89 and accompanying
text (describing the structure of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board).
52. See RFC Act, supra note 48, § 4, 47 Stat. at 6.
53. See id. Powers included the power to
adopt, alter, and use a corporate seal; to make contracts;.., to sue and be sued,
to complain and to defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Fed-
eral; ... and to prescribe, amend, and repeal, by its board of directors, by-laws,
rules, and regulations governing the manner in which... powers granted to it
by [the] law may be exercised and enjoyed, including the selection of its chair-
man and vice chairman ....
Id.
54. See RFC Act, supra note 48, § 3, 47 Stat. 5.
55. See id.
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than four members of the entire Board could belong to the same political
party.56
The Act authorized and directed Federal Reserve Banks to act as the
depositories, custodians and fiscal agents for the RFC in the performing
the powers granted under the Act.5 7 The Act likewise authorized the
RFC to act as a depository of public money, and it could also be em-
ployed as a financial agent for the national government." In addition,
the Act required other government agencies, such as the Treasury, the
Federal Farm Loan Board, the Comptroller of Currency and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, to provide the RFC with any records relat-
ing to the financial condition of the institutions seeking loans. 9
Under the RFC Act, the federal government subscribed the RFC's ini-
tial capital stock of $500 million.' In turn, the Act empowered the RFC
to issue three times its capital stock in the form of bonds and debentures,
and to set the interest rates on these obligations.6' The Act specifically
reserved fifty million dollars of the fund for crop production in 1932,62
and authorized the RFC to make loans to any bank or thrift institution,
even those in receivership or in the process of liquidation.63 Only a total
of $200 million, however, could be loaned to these troubled financial
institutions."
The Act prohibited the RFC from extending loans to any enterprise
not already in existence at the time the Act was passed.6" The Act placed
56. See id.
57. See id. § 7, 47 Stat. at 8.
58. See id. § 12, 47 Stat. at 10.
[T]he corporation shall be a depositary of public money .... and it may also be
employed as a financial agent of the Government; and it shall perform all such
reasonable duties, as depositary of public money and financial agent of the Gov-
ernment, as may be required of it. Obligations of the corporation shall be law-
ful investments, and may be accepted as security, for all fiduciary, trust, and
public funds the investment or deposit of which shall be under the authority or
control of the United States or any officer or officers thereof.
Id.
59. See id. § 8, 47 Stat. at 8. These government agencies were authorized to "make
available to the corporation, in confidence, such reports, records, or other information as
they may have available relating to the condition of financial institutions. . . with respect
to which the corporation has had or contemplates having transactions under this Act
.... '" Id. at 8-9.
60. See id. § 2, 47 Stat. 5.
61. See id. § 9, 47 Stat. at 9.
62. See id. § 2, 47 Stat. 5.
63. See id. § 5, 47 Stat. at 6-7.
[T]he corporation is authorized and empowered to make loans, upon such
terms and conditions not inconsistent with this Act as it may determine, to any
... building and loan association... including loans secured by the assets of
any bank that is closed, or in process of liquidation to aid in the reorganization
or liquidation of such banks, upon application of the receiver or liquidating
agent of such bank ....
Id.
64. See id. § 5, 47 Stat. at 7.
65. See id. "[N]o loan or advancement shall be made by the corporation for the pur-
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limits on the amount loaned to any one corporation and its subsidiary or
affiliated organizations.66 The RFC Act required any institution seeking
a loan through the RFC to submit to a full examination of its financial
records as a precondition to receiving any funds.6"
In addition to enumerating the RFC's powers as a government agency,
the Act also mandated that the Board of Directors liquidate the RFC
after one year, unless the President extended the deadline after determin-
ing that it was required.6" The Board of Directors was required to liqui-
date the RFC within ten years. If it failed to do so, the Secretary of the
Treasury had the power to effect the liquidation.69 The Secretary's
power in this regard was not exercised, however, because the RFC was
successfully liquidated7 ° and its functions transferred to the Housing and
Home Finance Administrator.71
B. Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932
As the Depression deepened in the 1930s, 72 the need for regulating the
financial industry became apparent. In 1931, in response to economic
conditions, Congress issued questionnaires to 8,000 S&Ls to determine
whether they were receptive to a national S&L regulatory agency.73 In
pose of initiating, setting on foot, or financing any enterprise not initiated, set on foot, or
undertaken prior to the adoption of this Act." Id.
66. See id; see also infra notes 312-329 and accompanying text (discussing bank hold-
ing companies).
67. See RFC Act, supra note 48, § 8, 47 Stat. at 8-9.
68. See id. § 13, 47 Stat. at 10.
69. See id. § 14, 47 Stat. at 10-11.
70. The RFC's prospective powers were transferred to the Housing and Home Fi-
nance Administrator pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 23 of 1950, 64 Stat. 1279. Its
power to conduct any transactions was then terminated at the close of business on June
30, 1954 under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act, ch. 282, 67
Stat. 230 (1953)(codified in 15 U.S.C. § 603(a)). The RFC as a separate entity was fi-
nally abolished under the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1957, § 6, 71 Stat. 647, 649. The
Plan provided for the retirement of the RFC's capital stock and for the payment of un-
used funds into the Treasury. See id. § 6(b), 71 Stat. at 649.
71. See Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1957, § 2, 71 Stat. 647.
72. See generally Burck and Silberman, Why the Depression Lasted So Long, in Great
Depressions 142-149 (J. Sperling ed. 1966) (discussing the "economic ignorance of the
times" as the primary reason for the Depression's duration).
During this period, competing economic theorists debated the causes of, and cures for,
the Depression, and their views are seen in the legislation of the day. The New Deal
legislation generally reflects the theories of John Maynard Keynes, who advocated a fo-
cus on the demand-side factors of the economy. See R. Ruffin & P. Gregory, Principles of
Macroeconomics 174, 178 (2d ed. 1986); C. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes
70-71 (1978). Keynes summed up his economic philosophy in the quote, "in the long
run, we are all dead." See R. Ruffin & P. Gregory, supra, at 174. This short-term per-
spective manifests itself in the legislation discussed in this Note. See, e.g., infra notes 112-
122 and accompanying text (discussing the social and economic factors underlying the
New Deal legislation).
73. See S.Rep. No. 837, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932). The questionnaire asked the
following four questions, with the number of affirmative responses given in brackets:
(1) Would the facilities provided by the proposed home loan discount banks for
borrowing on your home mortgages add desirable flexibility and security to the
S270 [Vol. 59
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light of generally favorable responses,74 Congress passed the Federal
Home Loan Bank Act ("FHLB Act").75 Although the Act was first pro-
posed during President Wilson's second term, 6 the Depression was the
decisive factor in passing the measure.77
1. Purpose
Congress listed fourteen separate reasons for passing the FHLB Act,78
but those reasons can be reduced to three general goals. First, the FHLB
Act was intended to boost the economy by creating a pool of funds for
the home financing industry.7 9 Second, it attempted to foster home own-
ership through favorable treatment of home mortgages."° Finally, Con-
gress sought to change S&Ls from short-term housing lenders to long-
term housing lenders."1 The structure of the Act also indicates an over-
arching agenda: "the regulatory provisions of this Act reveal an inten-
tion on the part of Congress to retain the broadest kind of federal control
over the number, powers and existence of these purely legislative
creatures."582
conduct of your institution? [5,898]; (2) Would operation of the discount banks
increase the amount of credit now available for legitimate use in your commu-
nity? [6,535]; (3) Is there a demonstrable need for actual home construction,
either new houses or remodeling work, that could be undertaken in your com-
munity if credit facilities were widened at the present time? [4,264]; and (4)
Would the facilities afforded by the proposed discount banks help to relieve the
dangers of foreclosure on urban homes and farms? [5,935].
Id.
74. See supra note 73. But see 75 Cong. Rec. 12,723 (1932) (statement of Rep. Mc-
Fadden) (opposed to the enactment of the law).
75. Ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449).
See generally Note, supra note 7 (discussing changes in the Federal Home Loan Bank
system effected by FIRREA.)
76. See H.R1 Rep. No. 1418, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1932); W. Woerheide, The
Savings and Loan Industry: Current Problems and Possible Solutions 3 (1984).
77. See W. Woerheide, supra note 76, at 3.
78. See H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 72nd Sess., 1st Sess. 9-12 (1932).
79. See 1 M. Malloy, supra note 25, § 1.3.4, at 52.
80. See 75 Cong. Rec. 12,612 (1932). "This legislation is intended to stimulate home
ownership in normal times and to protect and safeguard that ownership in times of busi-
ness depression and financial stress .... " Id. (statement of Rep. Hancock).
81. See, eg., id. at 12,608 (1932) ("A prime purpose of the home loan bank bill is to
promote the development of the long-term amortized mortgages which are so essential
for further home ownership.... The Federal home-loan bank system will care only for
the long-time credit needs of the home financing business.")(statement of Rep. Hancock);
id. at 12,612 (1932) ("The home-loan bank system is designed to divorce two incompati-
ble fields of finance--short-term commercial lending and long-term home financing.")
(statement of Rep. Hancock).
82. Fahey v. O'Melveny & Myers, 200 F.2d 420, 443 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 952 (1953). The Ninth Circuit also noted that "[t]he real significance of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Act lies in the fact that by this legislation Congress made sure that it
retained permanent control over the nationwide bank system it created in 1932." Id. at
455 (emphasis in original).
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2. Structure and Powers
The FHLB Act directed that no less than eight and no more than
twelve Federal Home Loan Bank Districts be established as soon as prac-
ticable.8 3 Under the Act, one Federal Home Loan Bank ("FHLB") per
district acted as the central institution for that region."
The wide variety of institutions, as well as the diversity of individual
state regulations, mandated that Congress establish a supervisory body to
oversee the regional FHLBs.85 Congress therefore created the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") s6 to coordinate this system of dis-
tricts and central institutions.8 7 The FHLBB was composed of five full-
time employees of the FHLB system.88 The President of the United
States appointed the Board members, subject to Senate approval, with
the proviso that no more than three Board members could belong to the
83. See Federal Home Loan Bank Act [hereinafter FHLB Act], ch. 522, § 3, 47 Stat.
725, 726 (1932). The FHLBB originally decided on eleven districts, each encompassing
several states (the financial center for each district is indicated in parentheses): District
One (Boston): Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
Rhode Island. District Two (New York City): New York and New Jersey. District
Three (Pittsburgh): Pennsylvania, Delaware, and West Virginia. District Four (Greens-
boro): Maryland, Washington, D.C., Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, and Florida. District Five (Cincinnati): Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Dis-
trict Six (Indianapolis): Michigan and Indiana. District Seven (Chicago): Wisconsin and
Illinois. District Eight (Des Moines): Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, and
South Dakota. District Nine (Little Rock): Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and
New Mexico. District Ten (Topeka): Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma. Dis-
trict Eleven (San Francisco): Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Califor-
nia, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, Alaska, and Hawaii. See United States Savings and Loan
League, Savings and Loan Fact Book 1959, at 93 (chart 45).
In 1964, District Eleven was divided. The new District Eleven (San Francisco) in-
cluded California, Nevada and Arizona. District Twelve (Spokane) included Washing-
ton, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Alaska and Hawaii. See United States
Savings and Loan League, Savings and Loan Fact Book 1964, at 111.
84. See FHLB Act, supra note 83, § 3, 47 Stat. at 726. "
When "created," the [Federal Home Loan Banks were] authorized and required
to perform the functions designated in the Act under a so-called 'organization
certificate'.. . which document [was] issued under authority vested in the [Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank] Board. This certificate [was] evidence of the corporate
existence of such banks as an integral part of what is frequently referred to as
the Federal Home Loan Bank System. By regulations of the Board these 'or-
ganization certificates' [were] to be deemed the 'charter' of a bank.
Fahey v. O'Melveny & Myers, 200 F.2d 420, 442 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952
(1953).
85. See 75 Cong. Rec. 12,611 (1932) (statement of Sen. Hancock).
86. Both the name and the structure of the FHLBB have changed. For a discussion
of the FHLBB's various name changes, see Home Loan Bank Board v. Mallonee, 196
F.2d 336, 342 n.3 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952 (1953). Because these altera-
tions do not impact on the role of the FHLBB in the S&L industry, this Note will consist-
ently refer to the Board as the FHLBB.
87. See FHLB Act, supra note 83, § 17, 47 Stat. at 736-37.
88. See id. Initially, the first Board member was chosen to serve for two years, the
second to serve for three years, and so on. After the expiration of this original term, new
members served for six years. Id. This selection process ensured that a new Board mem-
ber would be selected each year.
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same political party.8 9
Congress granted the FHLBB the power to adopt, amend and enforce
the rules and regulations necessary to effect the provisions of the Act.9'
In addition, the FHLBB could remove or suspend employees and agents
of the FHLB System, including the officers and directors of S&Ls.9"
While such powers are broad and therefore open to abuse, the courts
have traditionally deferred to the discretion of the FHLBB and the Dis-
trict Banks on these specialized matters.92
Each District Bank, in turn, was managed by a Board of Directors.93
Each Board consisted of eleven directors, two of whom were appointed
by the FHLBB.94 The other nine directors were nominated by FHLB
member institutions and elected by the already-appointed directors. 95
Each FHLB was empowered to borrow money, issue debentures and
bonds96 and promulgate rules and regulations for the various functions of
member institutions. 97 Where home owners could not obtain mortgage
money from "any other source," they could obtain such funds from any
bank organized under the FHLB Act.98 The Act also allowed for the
89. See id. This structure parallels the one created by Congress for the Board of
Directors of the RFC. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
90. See FHLB Act, supra note 83, § 17, 47 Stat. at 736-37. Current rules and regula-
tions promulgated for the FHLB System are found in 12 C.F.R. § 544.
91. See FHLB Act, supra note 83, § 17, 47 Stat. at 737.
92. See 1 M. Malloy, supra note 25, § 1.3.4, at 60; see also Bridgeport Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 307 F.2d 580 (3rd Cir. 1962)(upholding
FHLBB decision granting branching application), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 950 (1963); Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Rowe, 284 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1960)(upholding FHLBB
decision denying branching application); First Nat'l Bank of McKeeseport v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 225 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1955)(upholding FHLBB decision granting
branching application). The cases best addressing the powers of the FHLBB are ex-
amined under the Mallonee litigation, infra notes 225-247 and accompanying text.
93. See FHLB Act, supra note 83, § 7(a), 47 Stat. at 730.
94. See id. § 7(a)-(b), 47 Stat. at 730.
95. In order to implement this provision, the Act authorized the FHLBB to select the
original nine directors as well, who served until the end of 1932. See id. § 7(c), 47 Stat. at
730. The Act then divided all member institutions into three groups according to size,
and three individuals involved in the home-financing industry were elected from each
group. "Class A" directors from Group A (large) institutions were originally elected for
a one-year term. "Class B" directors from Group B (medium) institutions were origi-
nally elected for a two-year term. "Class C" directors from Group C (small) institutions
were originally elected for a three-year term. After these initial terms had expired, all
directors were elected for three year terms. See id. § 7(d), 47 Stat. at 730. See also supra
note 55 and accompanying text (RFC Act created a similar system of directors).
96. The debentures and bonds were tax-exempt under Section 13 of the Act. See
Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Mich., 365 U.S. 467, 483 (1961)(upholding the constitutionality
of taxation schemes on the assets of banks and S&Ls); Hoenig v. Huntington Nat'l Bank,
59 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1932)(same).
97. See FHLB Act, supra note 83, § 1 (b), 47 Stat. at 733.
98. See id. § 4(d), 47 Stat. at 727. Section 3 of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933
repealed § 4(d) of the FHLB Act, and transferred the function to the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation. See Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, § 4, 48 Stat. 128, 129-
32 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1464). Section 4(f) of the Home Owners'
Loan Act authorized the FHLB to make direct cash advances to homeowners who could
not obtain advances from "ordinary lending agencies." See id. § 4(f), 48 Stat. at 131.
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liquidation or reorganization of any F.HLB where such action furthered
the goals of the Act.99
With this supervisory scheme in place, the Act allowed "eligible" fi-
nancial institutions to become members, or non-member borrowers,"° of
the FHLB system.' Under the Act, an institution was eligible for
FHLB loans if it (1) was organized under state or federal law; (2) was
subject to inspections and regulation; and (3) made long-term home
mortgage loans. 102 Even if an institution met these three requirements,
the FHLBB could still refuse to lend funds to an institution "if, in the
judgment of the [B]oard, its financial condition [was] such that advances
[could] not safely be made ... or the character of its management or its
home-financing policy [was] inconsistent with sound and economical
home financing, or with the purposes of this Act."' 3 The Act author-
ized the Department of the Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency
and the Federal Reserve Board to disclose any information that would
aid the individual FHLBs in determining eligibility.'" An eligible insti-
tution that wished to join the FHLB system simply subscribed for stock
in the Federal Home Loan Bank in its district,'0 5 and was thereafter per-
mitted to apply for advances in writing."° If the application was ap-
proved, the FHLB advanced the funds, which were secured by home
mortgages held by the institution. 0 7
Members were allowed to withdraw from the FHLB system volunta-
rily by applying in writing to the Federal Home Loan Bank in its dis-
trict.'08 The District Bank could also remove an institution from
99. See FHLB Act, supra note 83, § 26, 47 Stat. at 740.
100. A "nonmember borrower" was an institution eligible for membership under
§ 4(a), but precluded from subscribing for FHLB stock by the laws of the state in which
it was organized. As the name suggests, however, such institutions were still able to se-
cure loans and advances from the Federal Home Loan Banks in their districts. See
FHLB Act, supra note 83, § 6(e), 47 Stat. at 728.
101. See id. § 4(a), 47 Stat. at 726.
102. See id. An institution not subject to inspection under state law could still be
eligible if it agreed to an inspection by the Board of Directors for that district. See id.
§ 4(c), 47 Stat. at 727; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text (concerning long-
term lending).
103. FHLB Act, supra note 83, § 4(a), 47 Stat. at 727.
104. See id. § 22(a), 47 Stat. at 739. See also supra note 59 and accompanying text
(same powers granted under the RFC Act). But see United States v. Kanan, 225 F. Supp.
711, 715 (D. Ariz. 1963) (receiver of member institution went beyond discretion in re-
questing investigation and information from FBI).
105. The capital stock of each Federal Home Loan Bank was divided into shares of
$100 each. See FHLB Act, supra note 83, § 6(b), 47 Stat. at 727. Every member institu-
tion was required to subscribe for stock equal to "[one] per centum of the aggregate of the
unpaid principal of the subscriber's home mortgage loans, but not less than $1,500." Id.
§ 6(c), 47 Stat. at 727.
106. See id. § 9, 47 Stat. at 731. Section 22(b) required every applicant to submit to an
examination of its financial records as a precondition to receiving the funds. See id.
§ 22(b), 47 Stat. at 739.
107. See FHLB Act, supra note 83, § 10(a), 47 Stat. at 731.
108. See id. § 6(i), 47 Stat. at 729.
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membership upon a determination, after an internal hearing, that the
member failed to comply with any provision of the Act or that it engaged
in unsound practices.l'I Moreover, where the Board found illegal prac-
tices, such as falsification of statements, embezzlement and unauthorized
use of the designation "FHLB," the Act provided for both fines and
imprisonment."'
3. Reactive Theory
The government generally regulates financial markets only in response
to an economic crisis."' The FHLB Act supports this characterization
of S&L legislation: it was enacted in response to the Depression. Three
factors created the impetus for change in the S&L system. First, eco-
nomic factors mandated government action. Personal savings fell from
$4.2 billion in 1929 to negative $600 million in 1932, consumption ex-
penditures fell from $79 billion in 1929 to $49.3 billion in 1932, and dis-
posable income fell from $83.1 billion in 1929 to $48.7 billion in 1932.
This resulted in a net savings fall from 5.1% of disposable income in
1929 to -1.2% in 1932.112 In light of these statistics, Congress admitted
that the Act was "based upon the principle of creating a central bank
during the present emergency.., and releas[ing] ready money for further
use during the depression." ' 3
Second, political pressure mandated some action to rescue homeown-
ers facing foreclosures. 1 4 The FHLB Act decreased competition be-
tween S&Ls for scarce funds by making government funds readily
available to eligible institutions. The S&Ls could used the funds to meet
withdrawal demands'1 5 and thereby reduce foreclosures as a way to meet
financial needs. Without the FHLB loans, the few competitive S&Ls
109. See id. §§ 5, 6(i), 47 Stat. at 727, 729.
110. See id. § 21(a)-(d), 47 Stat. at 738. Under Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62
Stat. 862, criminal penalties were transferred to Title 18 of the U.S.C.
111. See Malloy, supra note 13, at 726; C. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes
3-7 (1978).
112. See United States Savings & Loan League, Savings and Loan Fact Book 1955, at
9.
113. 75 Cong. Rec. 12,627 (1932).
114. See 75 Cong. Rec. 12,619 (1932). Rep. LaGuardia read the following letter from
a constituent:
Dear Congressman: The New York Tribune this morning on the front page
indicates a loan has been made by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to
Prudence Co. (Inc.) of New York.... [I]sn't there some way you and your
fearless coterie in the House can stop the raids of these crooks on Government
money? I had a mortgage from one of this crowd's affiliated companies on a
little house in Brooklyn.... When I lost my job... they foreclosed, sold me
out ....
I couldn't get $3,500 to save my house, but [Prudence Co.] can get four hun-
dred and twenty-eight times that much to hold their high-paying jobs and swing
along until after the depression is over and then wade in for the kill.
IdC
115. See Ornstein, supra note 16, at 35.
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would have garnered all the scarce funds available, resulting in even
more foreclosures by the S&Ls that were unable to compete. The Act
thus relieved political pressure by rescuing homeowners, and it simulta-
neously curried public favor by accomplishing the popular New Deal ob-
jective of decreasing market competition.1 16
Third, the structure and condition of the Act reveal that it was formu-
lated in response to a crisis situation, and a close examination reveals
that it is an amalgam of other regulatory legislation. For example, the
structure of the RFC's regulatory board117 is similar to that of the
FHLBB"1 ' despite the obvious differences in the needs of homeowners
and farmers. 119 Likewise, the penalty scheme of the FHLB Act 120 is
quite similar to the scheme created under the National Bank Act of
1864,121 despite the obvious differences between S&Ls and banks.' 22
Such patchwork legislation was ill-suited to the unique characteristics of
the S&L industry.
C. Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933
The year 1933 brought even more drastic measures to cushion the ef-
fects of the Depression and foster economic recovery. In March, Presi-
dent Roosevelt declared the Banking Holiday,123 which "drew a line of
demarcation between all financial institution history which had gone
before and any which would come after."' 24  With the economy still
reeling, however, additional S&L regulatory legislation was passed.
1. Purpose
By April 1933, an estimated forty percent of home mortgages were in
default, with a resulting epidemic of foreclosures by home-financing insti-
tutions. 125 Congress responded by enacting the Home Owners' Loan Act
("HOLA") 12 6 on June 13, 1933.127 Its primary purpose was "to protect
116. See Fischel, Rosenfield, and Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding
Companies, 73 Va. L. Rev. 301, 303 (1987); Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance in the
Emerging Financial Services Industry, 1 Yale J. on Reg. 195, 197 (1984).
117. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
119. See 75 Cong. Rec. 12,617 (1932).
120. See FHLB Act, supra note 83, § 21, 47 Stat. at 738-39.
121. See ch. 106, § 55, 13 Stat. 99, 116 (1864).
122. See 75 Cong. Rec. 12,724 (1932)(letter of Chester Morrell, Secretary of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board).
123. Proclamation No. 2040, 48 Stat. 1691 (1933); see also Burck and Silberman, Why
the Depression Lasted So Long, in Great Depressions 142, 144 (. Sperling ed. 1966)(The
holiday was prompted by the fact that "[iun the first two months of 1933 [money] hoard-
ing increased by $900 million, and the merest rumor was enough to start a run on a
bank.").
124. Ewalt, supra note 36, at 92.
125. See id. at 36-37.
126. Ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (1933)(codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1464).
127. Three days later, Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
under the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (codified at 12 U.S.C.,
[Vol. 59S276
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small-home owners from foreclosure and to relieve them of a portion of
the burden of excessive interest and principal payments incurred during
the period of higher values and higher earning power."'" In addition,
HOLA was intended "to encourage thrift... and to build up a great
cooperative financial structure, dealing strictly with homes." 29
2. Structure and Powers
HOLA created the Home Owners' Loan Corporation ("HOLC"), 3 °
which was empowered to acquire home mortgages in exchange for tax-
exempt bonds.13 The HOLC, as holder of the mortgages, then allowed
the mortgagors a longer period of repayment, which decreased the mort-
gagors' monthly payments.132 In addition, mortgage principal payments
were deferred for three years to ease mortgagors' financial distress.'33
The HOLC was also authorized to make cash advances to mortgage
holders to pay taxes and real estate assessments.134 This structure thus
protected the homeowner-who could more readily meet the favorable
terms offered by the HOLC-from foreclosure. 3-
The HOLA also authorized the FHLBB to provide for the "organiza-
distributed throughout chapters 2, 3, and 6). The practice of insuring deposits was initi-
ated because the public lacked confidence in the banking system and was thus afraid to
deposit money that could be used for investment. Banks also hesitated to lend money for
investment because they feared that the loans might not be repaid. Deposit insurance
restored confidence in the system and therefore contributed to credit expansion. See H.R.
Rep. No. 150, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933).
128. 77 Cong. Rec. 1618 (1933)(letter from President Franklin Roosevelt); see also
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Loomis, 97 F.2d 831, 840 (7th Cir. 1938)(upholding
Congress' authority to enact HOLA because of the need to protect home owners, and to
preserve and promote a sound home financing system).
129. S. Doc. No. 74, 73rd Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1933); see also H.R. Doc. No. 448, 78th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1944)("while Home Owners' Loan Corporation was created primarily
for the direct relief to home owners, it was also regarded as a financing device for the
effective rehabilitation of a dangerously undermined mortgage structure.").
130. See Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 [hereinafter HOLA], ch. 64, § 4(a), 48 Stat.
128, 129; see also H.R. Doc. No. 448, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944)(HOLC's annual report
to Congress); H.. Doc. No. 668, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) (same); M. Doc. No. 71,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945)(same).
131. See HOLA, supra note 130, §§ 4(b)- (d), 48 Stat. at 129-30. Section 4(b) granted
the FHLBB the authority to determine the amount of stock to be held by the HOLC, and
Congress set the interest rate ceiling on the bonds at four percent. See id. § 4(b)-(c), 48
Stat. at 129.
132. See id. § 4(d)(2), 48 Stat. at 130.
Each home mortgage or other obligation... shall be carried as a first lien or
refinanced as a home mortgage by the Corporation... and shall be amortized
by means of monthly payments sufficient to retire the interest and principal
within a period of not to exceed fifteen years .... The Corporation may at any
time grant an extension of time to any home owner for the payment of any
installment of principal or interest owed by him to the Corporation.
Id.
133. See HOLA, supra note 130, § 4(d), 48 Stat. at 130.
134. See id. § 4(d)(2), 48 Stat. at 130.
135. The HOLC's programs, however, were obvious targets of corruption-many
homeowners stopped making mortgage payments in the hopes of meeting HOLC criteria
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tion, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associa-
tions to be known as 'Federal Savings and Loan Associations.' ""3
Federal S&Ls were granted automatic membership in the FHLB sys-
tem'37 and also enjoyed tax exemptions on certain assets.1 38 In order to
establish the federal S&L system, Congress gave the FHLBB the discre-
tion to issue charters 139 only to those institutions of good moral charac-
ter and only for S&Ls in areas where there was a probability of usefulness
and success.' 40 These powers were later interpreted as authorizing the
FHLBB to make branching decisions as well. 41
Moreover, HOLA allowed state-chartered S&Ls that were members in
the FHLB system to convert to federal charters, 42 a provision that
proved troublesome on two grounds. First, federally chartered S&Ls
eventually sought to convert to state charters, which raised federalism
questions between federal and state regulators. Congress resolved this
issue when it amended HOLA to allow for this conversion.143 Second,
S&Ls converting from federal to state charters questioned the FHLBB's
authority to oversee the federal-to-state conversion process. The courts
agreed with the S&Ls and found that the FHLBB lacked this power.144
The FHLBB was empowered to liquidate or appoint a receiver or con-
servator for any federal S&L without a prior hearing. 45 Congress, how-
so that their mortgages could be assumed on more favorable terms. See Ewalt, supra note
36, at 41.
136. HOLA, supra note 130, § 5(a), 48 Stat. at 132; see also Duruin v. Allentown Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 218 F.Supp. 716, 718 (E.D. Pa. 1963) ("A federal savings and loan
association is without doubt an instrumentality of the United States.").
137. See HOLA, supra note 130, § 5(f), 48 Stat. at 133.
138. See id. § 5(h), 48 Stat. at 133-34.
139. Chartering is the practice of establishing [an] entity designed to engage in the
functions of a depository institution. A regulatory official or agent must review the char-
ter and approve it before it can engage in such business, with the consequence that these
rules amount to a restriction on entry into the market. 1 M. Malloy, supra note 25, § 1.3,
at 22 n.I.
140. See HOLA, supra note 130, § 5(e), 48 Stat. at 133; see also Federal Home Loan
Bank Bd. v. Rowe, 284 F.2d 274, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1960)("A delicate balance of the Board's
judgment clearly was required in determining the likelihood of successful operations, not
only for the welfare of shareholders in the association but with regard to the possible
impairment of confidence in the stability of other thrift institutions."). Current rules and
regulations for federal S&Ls are found in 12 C.F.R. ch. V (1990).
141. See supra note 92; see also Central Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank
Bd., 293 F.Supp. 617, 623 (S.D. Iowa 1968)("[I]t is abundantly clear that decisions with
respect to applications for charters, branches.., and similar matters relating to federal
savings and loan associations are committed to the exclusive discretion of the Board."),
aff'd, 422 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1970).
142. See HOLA, supra note 130, § 5(i), 48 Stat. at 134.
143. See Act of July 3, 1948, ch. 825, 62 Stat. 1239 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(i)).
144. See, eg., Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Greater Delaware Valley Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 277 F.2d 437, 439-40 (3rd Cir. 1960)(federal S&L under investigation could
convert to state charter despite FHLBB protest because federal-to-state conversion pro-
cess governed by state financial agencies).
145. See HOLA, supra note 130, § 5(d), 48 Stat. at 133; see also Fahey v. Calverley,
208 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1953)("A receivership proceeding is never an end in itself, but
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ever, recognized that this power was drastic and should be used only in
extreme circumstances. 1" Eventually, the constitutionality of the liqui-
dation/receivership power was challenged on due process grounds, and
was upheld in Fahey v. Mallonee. 47
HOLA also imposed penalties for embezzlement, falsification of
records or overvaluation of securities' in a fashion similar to the Na-
tional Bank Act of 1864, the RFC Act and the FHLB Act. Finally,
HOLA provided for the liquidation of the HOLC after the objectives of
HOLA had been accomplished. The FHLBB was directed to oversee the




The economic conditions of 1933 support the inference of reactive leg-
islation. Congressional statements, however, as well as HOLA's very
structure, further attest to its enactment as a curative measure, rather
than as an addition to a regulatory framework.
Congress admittedly passed HOLA in response to the rash of foreclo-
sures between 1932 and 1933.150 Furthermore, provisions in HOLA (in-
cluding the creation of the HOLC) were to take effect seven to ten days
after the law was passed."' This indicates that Congress was attempting
to solve a pressing problem. Finally, the provision requiring the liquida-
tion of the HOLC152 was not designed to strengthen the S&L industry in
the future. Rather, the HOLC was originally designed to remedy the
problems of the past, with no contribution to an enduring S&L industry.
Moreover, to the extent that HOLA was a vehicle for the creation of the
HOLC, the same is also true for HOLA.
is always ancillary to a principal proceeding." (citation omitted)), cerL denied, 347 U.S.
955 (1954).
146. Congress noted that impending S&L failures constituted an emergency situation
such that
the [FHLBB] has no alternative but to move in quickly and take control of the
association to conserve the assets for the protection of the shareholders. Absent
a genuine emergency, [FHLBB] action of this kind is arbitrary and unlawful,
and bespeaks a callous disregard for the ruinous consequences of summary
seizure action, which inevitably includes a 'run' on the association by panicked
depositors, the disruption of business and community relationships carefully
built up over the years by the association, and rapid depletion of its assets.
H.R. Rep. No. 2083, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1960).
147. 332 U.S. 245 (1947). See infra notes 232-240 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of this case.
148. See HOLA, supra note 130, § 8, 48 Stat. at 134-35.
149. See id. § 4(k), 48 Stat. at 132.
150. See S. Doc. No. 74, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1933)("Home Owners' Loan Corpo-
ration is for the relief of home owners in distress with their mortgages.").
151. See id.
152. See HOLA, supra note 130, § 4(k), 48 Stat. at 132. The HOLC was abolished in
Act of June 30, 1953, ch. 170, § 21, 67 Stat. 126.
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D. National Housing Act of 1934
1. Purpose
After conducting hearings on financing and employment in the hous-
ing field,153 Congress enacted the National Housing Act ("NHA"). 54
Its overall purposes were to improve national housing and to stimulate
the sluggish economy. Specifically, the Act targeted the home finance
industry, seeking to prevent risky new mortgages and to decrease the
need for second mortgages.15 The NHA also sought to provide home
owners with funds for home maintenance and improvement. 15 6 Congress
felt that these objectives could best be achieved by restoring confidence in
the S&L system through an insurance program.' 57 In sum, the Act in-
sured financial institutions and mortgages to induce lending,'5" and in-
sured deposits to provide the S&Ls with the funds necessary to make
loans. 159
2. Structure and Powers
The NHA established the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA")
and the position of Administrator of the FHA.' 6  The Administrator
was authorized to incur a total liability of $200 million for the FHA by
insuring eligible financial institutions against losses on defaulted loans. 161
Once an institution obtained insurance, it could also secure loans from
the FHA by using its own mortgages as collateral.
162
Title II of the NHA created the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund
("MMIF"), a revolving fund of up to $1 billion used to carry out the
153. See H.R. Rep. No. 1922, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
154. Ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934)(codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1730).
155. See H.R. Rep. No. 1922, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
156. See id. at 2. In furtherance of this goal, the NHA amended the FHLB Act to
authorize FHLBs to make home improvement loans. National Housing Act [hereinafter
NHA], ch. 847, § 502, 48 Stat. 1246, 1261 (1934).
157. H.R. Rep. No. 1922, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
158. See infra notes 161-171 and accompanying text.
159. Some members of Congress, however, realized the potential for losses in the bil-
lions under this insurance scheme. See 78 Cong. Rec. 11,194 (1934)(statement of Rep.
Hancock)("I wish [Rep. Cavicchia] would state to the House what in his opinion would
be the potential liability of the United States Government if we ... permitted the Govern-
ment to guarantee or insure mortgages, old and new, to an unlimited amount, with possi-
ble losses up into the billions?").
160. See NHA, supra note 156, § 1, 48 Stat. at 1246.
161. See id. § 2, 48 Stat. at 1246. The Administrator was empowered to
insure banks, trust companies, personal finance companies, mortgage compa-
nies, building and loan associations, installment lending companies, and other
such financial institutions, which are approved by him as eligible for credit in-
surance, against losses which they may sustain as a result of loans and advances
of credit, and purchases of obligations representing loans and advances of
credit, made by them subsequent to the date of the enactment of this Act and
prior to January 1, 1936 ....
Id.
162. See id. § 3, 48 Stat. at 1247.
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other provisions of Title I.163 Under those provisions, the Administra-
tor was empowered to insure the mortgages of eligible financial institu-
tions1" and to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to achieve the
purposes of the Act.1 65 In addition, the Administrator was authorized to
insure mortgages for property held by federal or state governments if
used to provide low income housing.' These mortgages were not sub-
ject to the eligibility requirements imposed on ordinary financial
institutions.
167
Under the NRA scheme, when a mortgagor defaulted on his obliga-
tion, the financial institution would convey the mortgage or the title of
the foreclosed property to the FHA.' 68 In return, the FHA reimbursed
the institution for the unpaid principal on the mortgage, plus all pay-
ments made by the institution for taxes and insurance on the property. 69
In addition, the institution received a redeemable "certificate of claim"
for an amount, determined by the Administrator, equal to the expected
return if the mortgagor had honored the obligation. 7 '
The NHA also provided for the insurance of S&L accounts. Title IV
established the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
("FSLIC") to administer this function:
There is hereby created a Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpo-
ration... which shall insure the accounts of institutions eligible for
insurance as hereinafter provided, and shall be under the direction of a
board of trustees .... The members of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board shall constitute the board of trustees of the Corporation .... 171
The FSLIC issued capital stock in the amount of $100 million, divided
into shares of $100 each. 172 The NHA then amended HOLA to provide
the HOLC with the funds needed to subscribe for the full amount of the
FSLIC stock.1
73
Title IV required that any S&L seeking deposit insurance had to apply
163. See id. §§ 202, 203, 48 Stat. at 1248.
164. See id. § 203(b), 48 Stat. at 1248 (seven eligibility requirements for insurance cov-
erage under Title II).
165. See id. § 203(d); see also supra notes 91, 96-97 and accompanying text (Federal
Home Loan Banks and the FHLBB held similar powers).
166. See NHA, supra note 156, § 207, 48 Stat. at 1252.
167. See id.
168. See id. § 204(a), 48 Stat. at 1249. The Administrator was permitted to trade,
handle or dispose of real property "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law." Id.
§ 204(e), 48 Stat. at 1250. Where the institution failed to turn over the title, or where the
mortgagor paid in full, the institution's rights under Section 204 terminated. See id.
§ 205(f), 48 Stat. at 1250.
169. See id. § 204(a), 48 Stat. at 1249.
170. See id. § 204(c), 48 Stat. at 1250.
171. Id. § 402(a), 48 Stat. at 1256; see also Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Third
Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 153 F.2d 678, 680-81 (6th Cir. 1946)(recognizing FSLIC as an
instrumentality of the United States).
172. See NHA, supra note 156, § 402(b), 48 Stat. at 1256.
173. See id. § 506(a), 48 Stat. at 1263-64.
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to the FSLIC and submit to an examination of its financial condition. 174
The FSLIC was directed to reject the application of any institution (1) if
its financial policies were unsafe or (2) if the "character" of the manage-
ment was inconsistent with the goals of Title IV.' Deposits at ap-
proved institutions were insured up to $5000 for any one investor/
depositor. 176
The Act placed various restrictions on S&Ls whose deposits were in-
sured by the FSLIC. First, it required insured S&Ls to maintain "ade-
quate" reserves, as designated under the FSLIC's regulations., 77 Second,
insured S&Ls were prohibited from making loans outside a fifty-mile ra-
dius of their principal office.1 7 ' Finally, insured S&Ls could not issue
instruments with a guaranteed yield or fixed maturity date without
FSLIC approval.179
Under Title IV, depositors in an insured S&L received insurance
payouts in the event of the institution's failure. 8 Upon default, the
FSLIC could either (1) notify each account holder of a new insured ac-
count in another institution (if an institution willing to assume the ac-
counts could be found)18' or (2) pay the account holder 10% in cash,
50% of the remainder within one year, and the balance in non-interest-
bearing bonds within three years. 182 An institution could withdraw from
the FSLIC membership by written notice to the FSLIC. In addition, the
FSLIC was authorized to terminate the insurance coverage of any insti-
tution found to be in violation of the provisions of the NHA. 183
The FSLIC was also empowered to liquidate any insured institution,
state or federal, or to act as a conservator or receiver for federal S&Ls. 84
Where state-chartered S&Ls were federally insured, only state courts had
174. See id. § 403(b), 48 Stat. at 1257-58.
175. See id. § 403(c), 48 Stat. at 1258.
176. See id. § 405(a), 4& Stat. at 1259.
177. See id. § 403(b), 48 Stat. at 1257-58. The reserve requirement was in addition to
premium payments on the insurance itself, which were set out in Section 404 of the
NHA. See id. § 404, 48 Stat. at 1258.
178. See id. § 403(b), 48 Stat. at 1258.
179. See id.
180. See id. § 405(b), 48 Stat. at 1259.
181. See id. § 405(b), 48 Stat. at 1259. This procedure is known as a "Purchase and
Assumption Transaction." See Phillips, Asserting and Defending Claims Involving an
FSLIC Relationship, 20 St. Mary's L.J. 827, 835 (1989).
182. See NHA, supra note 156, § 405(b), 48 Stat. at 1259; see also Federal Say. & Loan
Ins. Corp. v. Huttner, 401 F.2d 58, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1968)(FSLIC does not insure expected
earnings on savings deposits; FSLIC membership does not "convert the status of associa-
tion members from that of investors to that of creditors" of FSLIC).
183. See NHA, supra note 156, § 407(b), 48 Stat. at 1261. In cases of involuntary
termination, insurance coverage continued for a period of five years on already existing
accounts. See id. § 407(b), 48 Stat. at 1261.
184. See id. § 406, 48 Stat. at 1259; see also Phillips, supra note 181, at 833 (describing
FSLIC's powers as receiver or conservator). Allowing a conservator or receiver under
FSLIC "in no way amend[ed] the provisions of Section 5 of the Home Owners' Loan Act,
whereby the [FHLBB was] authorized to provide in its rules and regulations for the ap-
pointment of a conservator and for the merger, consolidation, etc., of savings and loan
[Vol. 59S282
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
the power to appoint a conservator or receiver; however, the state court
was allowed to designate the FSLIC for this purpose.8 5 Once the
FSLIC seized the institution as a receiver or conservator, it was empow-
ered to continue the business of the insured S&L, including settling and
releasing claims for or against the S&L." 6 The FSLIC could do "all
other things necessary" to effect the receivership or conservatorship, and
was subject only to the authority of the court or other public author-
ity." 7 Finally, the NHA authorized the FSLIC to impose both fines and
imprisonment for embezzlement, falsification of documents, forgery or
other crimes perpetrated against either the FHA or the FSLIC.'
3. Reactive Theory
Three factors support the theory that the NHA, like its predecessors,
was a response to an economic crisis. First, the economy was still suffer-
ing from the effects of the Depression, and therefore S&Ls needed addi-
tional protection." 9 Consequently, Congress was compelled to legislate
until there was some positive effect on the economy. The NHA "repre-
sents another major attack by the administration in the struggle to over-
come the forces of destruction to bring about a restoration of normal
employment conditions in the United States."'' t9
Second, despite the legislation recently enacted, the public still lacked
confidence in the S&L industry. The insurance provisions of the NHA
were thus designed to foster confidence,' a goal that spoke more to the
associations...." Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Mallonee, 196 F.2d 336, 342-43 n.3 (9th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952 (1953).
185. See NHA, supra note 156, § 406(c), 48 Stat. at 1260.
186. See id. § 406(d), 48 Stat. at 1260.
187. See id. If the district court finds that it is without jurisdiction to hear the claim,
the receivership will fail. See Fahey v. Calverley, 208 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 955 (1954).
188. See NHA, supra note 156, § 512, 48 Stat. at 1265.
189. See Ewalt, supra note 36, at 26.
The fact that the peak of savings and loan mortality occurred in 1933 is note-
worthy; the new Washington aids-the Federal Home Loan Bank System and
the federal chartering of associations-were too new at that time to exert lead-
ership in pulling associations out of their troubles. It was too soon for the new
state laws, designed to help savings and loan institutions survive the depression,
to be fully implemented ....
Id.
190. 78 Cong. Rec. 11,191 (1934)(statement of Rep. Steagall).
191. See, eg., 77 Cong. Rec. 4032 (1933) (statement of Rep. Fuller).
This panic, causing general bank failures, has caused the people to lose confi-
dence in banks. The best way to restore that confidence is to examine strictly
and regulate banking and guarantee the deposits of all banks sufficiently solvent
to pass a rigid examination. We should make it impossible for banks to accept
deposits, fail, and pay only a small percentage.
Id. See also H.R. Rep. No. 150, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933)(statement of Rep. Stea-
gall)("The public is afraid to deposit their money in the banks, and the banks are afraid to




immediate needs of the economy than to the structural soundness of the
S&L system.
Finally, there was a general concern that S&Ls would be unable to
compete with banks, whose deposits had been insured under the Banking
Act of 1933.192 Without deposit insurance for S&Ls, depositors would
simply transfer funds to banks, eventually leading to the demise of the
S&L industry. 93 Because S&Ls were recognized as an integral part of
the housing industry, 94 Congress had no choice but to pass the NHA.
E. Other Legislation of Interest
1. Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944
The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944195 was enacted to help
veterans obtain housing.' 96 Under the Act, the Administrator of Veter-
ans' Affairs was authorized to guarantee up to fifty percent of any mort-
gage to a veteran.' 97 Moreover, the Administrator was directed to make
the interest payments on the portion of the mortgage guaranteed under
the Act.'98 Finally, the maximum interest rate on guaranteed loans was
set at four percent.' 99 These provisions helped achieve the Act's goals
by effectively allowing smaller downpayments and longer repayment pe-
riods for veterans." °
2. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
Congress had been considering a uniform procedural structure for the
various government agencies for more than ten years.20' In light of the
192. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified at 12 U.S.C., distributed throughout chapters 2, 3,
and 6); see also Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance in the Emerging Financial Services
Industry, 1 Yale J. on Reg. 195, 197 (1984).
Underlying much of the new legislation was a pervasive belief-which extended
to nonfinancial fields-that excessive competition was a primary cause of the
economic collapse. The new system was intended, among other things, to re-
strain competition, not only among financial industry groups but also within the
banking industry itself.
Id. (footnote omitted).
193. See Long, Schilling, and Van Cleef, Enhancing the Value of the Thrift Franchise:
A Possible Solution for the Dilemma of the FSLIC?, 37 Cath. U.L Rev. 385, 392-93
(1988).
194. See generally 75 Cong. Rec. 12,607 (1932)(statement of Rep. Hancock)("There
are four major sources of first-mortgage loans on small homes in this country. The larg-
est single source is the building and loan association. .. ").
195. Ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284 (codified as amended 38 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.).
196. See Ewalt, supra note 36, at 237.
197. Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, ch. 268, § 500(a), 58 Stat. 284, 291.
198. See id. § 500(b), 58 Stat. at 291.
199. See id. § 500(c), 58 Stat. at 291.
200. See generally Ewalt, supra note 36, at 244-245 ("Over the years during which the
veterans proved to be remarkably good risks, the associations came to realize they needed
to reexamine many of their previous notions about loan percentages and maturities.").
201. See H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1195.
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emergence of an administrative state resulting from the New Deal legisla-
tion, government bodies called for clear guidelines, so that procedure
would be consistent throughout the federal administrative bodies. 2
This was especially true for banking regulatory agencies, because "[t]he
nature of banking and of the public interest in banks shape the proce-
dural aspects of bank supervision in forms different from those encoun-
tered in other branches of administrative regulation.""2 3
Congress responded to this need by enacting the Administrative Proce-
dure Act ("APA"),2  which organized all federal agencies under the
same set of procedural rules. First, the APA required that each agency
describe its organizational and procedural structure, as well as the rules,
regulations and general policies promulgated by it under the law.205 Sec-
ond, the Act specified the procedure to be followed for administrative
hearings' and the circumstances under which a party might seek judi-
cial review.2 '7 Specifically, judicial review was not available where the
action in question was within the agency's discretion." If not otherwise
limited by law, however, the reviewing court was given the power to
compel any agency action that was withheld, and to set aside agency
actions violating the Constitution or without support in fact or law.'
3. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1947
By 1947, it had become apparent that the functions of the various fed-
eral housing agencies were interrelated, and that the existing structure
was "established piecemeal over a period of years."2 0 Consequently,
Congress sought to consolidate the various housing-related agencies into
one governmental unit. The Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1947 (the
"Plan")"1 merged the FHLBB, HOLC, the FSLIC, FHA, United States
Housing Authority, Defense Homes Corporation, and United States
Housing Corporation into one agency called the "Housing and Home
Finance Agency." '212 Those entities were then abolished as independent
agencies 213 and re-established as constituent agencies within the Housingand Home Finance Agency. 214 The Administrator of the Housing and
202. See S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 298 (1945).
203. Monograph No. 13, S. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 42 (1940-41).
204. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (dispersed throughout Title 5 U.S.C.). See generally
Malloy, supra note 13, at 724-25 (examining "the hearing practices and procedures of the
federal regulators in the enforcement context, under the [APA]").
205. See Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 204, § 3, 60 Stat. at 238.
206. See id. §§ 7, 8, 60 Stat. at 241-42.
207. See id. § 10, 60 Stat. at 243.
208. See id.
209. See id. § 10(e), 60 Stat. at 243.
210. 1947 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1839, 1840 (President Truman's letter to
Congress).
211. 61 Stat. 954 (1947)(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 133y-133y-16).
212. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1947, § 1, 61 Stat. 954.
213. See id. § 9, 61 Stat at 956.
214. See id. § 1, 61 Stat. at 954.
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Home Finance Agency was charged with organizing and coordinating
the functions of these constituent agencies.21 In addition, the Plan cre-
ated the National Housing Council to promote consistency among the
216various agencies.
Under the Plan, the structure of the "constituent" Board (the Home
Loan Bank Board) was also altered. It now consisted of only three mem-
bers, who were appointed by the President subject to Senate approval.21
The Plan then transferred to the Board the functions of the the FHLBB,
the Board of Directors of the HOLC and the Board of Trustees of the
FSLIC.21s However, this reorganization understandably caused confu-
sion among both the courts and financial institutions, and yielded a few
unintended results.219 Eventually, the FHLBB (and thus the FSLIC)220
regained autonomy in 1955, when the FHLBB was re-established as an
independent government agency.22'
III. 1950-1959
During the 1950s, the government continued the policy of "easy
money" begun in the late 1940s. 222 Consequently, although the economy
experienced inflation and a few relatively minor recessions, 223 the decade
was characterized by a great increase in productivity: During the 1950s,
personal income, consumption expenditures and personal savings ex-
panded with few exceptions. 224 In this favorable atmosphere, where eco-
nomic conditions no longer threatened the existence of the S&L industry,
individual S&Ls were able to challenge the provisions of the regulatory
legislation that had arisen under the New Deal.
A. The Mallonee Litigation
The Mallonee litigation involved a series of cases centered around
Long Beach Federal Savings and Loan Association ("Long Beach"),225
215. See id. § 5(b), 61 Stat. at 955.
216. See Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 204, § 6, 60 Stat. at 240.
217. See id. § 2(a), 61 Stat. at 954.
218. Id. § 2(c), 61 Stat. at 954.
219. See Howard v. United States, 195 F.2d 974, 975-76 (9th Cir. 1952)(S&L president
could not be convicted of filing a false report with the FHLBB because at the time the
report was made, the FHLBB had been technically abolished under the Plan).
220. The board of trustees of the FSLIC was composed of the members of the FHLBB.
See NHA, supra note 156, § 402(a), 48 Stat. at 1256.
221. Housing Amendments of 1955, ch. 783, § 109(b), 69 Stat. 635, 640 (codified as
amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1437(B)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 913, 84th Cong., 1st Sss.
(1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2902, 2926 (because the
Board was originally created as an independent agency, and because it remained "self-
supporting," it was restored to independent status).
222. See 4 Documentary History of Banking and Currency in the United States 324-25
(H. Krooss ed. 1983).
223. See id. at 326.
224. See United State Savings & Loan League, Savings and Loan Fact Book 1960, at
11.
225. Long Beach was chartered as a federal mutual S&L on July 10, 1934. Federal
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the FHLBB and the legislation granting the FHLBB its various regula-
tory powers. In May 1946, the FHLBB, without notice or a hearing,
placed Long Beach under conservatorship,1 6 apparently because it felt
that the association was engaging in unsound practices." 7 In response,
the association commenced a class action suit in the name of Mallonee (a
shareholder) against Fahey (chairman of the FHLBB) and Ammann (the
conservator), among others." 8 The principal claims of the suits con-
cerned the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of HOLA," '9 which author-
ized conservatorships, the propriety of the FHLBB's appointment of
Ammann as conservator, and the district court's jurisdiction to review
the FHLBB's decisions." 0 The decisions issued in the Mallonee litiga-
tion left unanswered several questions that were later addressed in the
Housing Act of 1954,231 but it did help solidify the various powers
granted to the FHLBB under the extant S&L regulatory legislation.
In Fahey v. Mallonee,232 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of Section 5(d) of HOLA 3 on three grounds. First, the Court ex-
Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Elliott, 386 F.2d 42, 44 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1011 (1968).
226. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 247 (1947). The FHLBB was given the
authority to place an unsound S&L under conservatorship in HOLA, supra note 130,
§ 5(d), 48 Stat. at 133.
Ironically, Long Beach Federal was again placed under conservatorship in 1960. See
Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Elliott, 386 F.2d 42, 44-45 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1011 (1968). Consequently, there was a run on deposits and Long Beach lost
$37 million in withdrawals in the first four or five weeks of the takeover. See H.R. Rep.
No. 2083, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1960). Long Beach was eventually allowed to convert
to a state charter despite protest from the FHLBB. See id. at 14.
227. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 247 (1947).
Generally speaking, an 'unsafe or unsound practice' embraces any action, or
lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent
operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal
risk or loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the agencies ad-
ministering the insurance funds.
112 Cong. Rec. 26,474 (1966).
228. See Mallonee v. Fahey, 68 F. Supp. 418 (S.D. Cal. 1946), rev'd, 332 U.S. 245
(1947).
229. See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
230. The litigation lasted almost ten years, involving over 50 interpleaders and generat-
ing over 100 hearings. See Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Mallonee, 196 F.2d 336, 369 (9th
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952 (1953).
231. See infra notes 248-273 and accompanying text.
232. 332 U.S. 245 (1947); see also Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Mallonee, 196 F.2d 336,
355 (9th Cir. 1952)(summarizing the Court's seventeen holdings in Fahey v. Mallonee),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952 (1953).
233. Ch. 64, § 5(d), 48 Stat. 128, 133 (1933). Section 5(d) provides:
The Board shall have full power to provide in the rules and regulations herein
authorized for the reorganization, consolidation, merger, or liquidation of such
associations, including the power to appoint a conservator or a receiver to take
charge of the affairs of any such association, and to require an equitable read-
justment of the capital structure of the same; and to release any such association
from such control and permit its further operation.
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plained that HOLA was clearly a regulatory, and not a penal, statute.234
In this vein, the Court stated that "discretion to make regulations to
guide supervisory action in such matters may be constitutionally permis-
sible while it might not be allowable to authorize creation of new crimes
in uncharted fields." 23 5
Second, the Court recognized the unique nature of the S&L industry,
and therefore gave due deference to already-established practices for con-
servatorships. 236 The Court noted that "the delicate nature of the insti-
tution and the impossibility of preserving credit during an investigation
has made it an almost invariable custom to apply supervisory authority
in this summary manner. "237
Finally, the court stressed the "elementary rule" of constitutional ju-
risprudence that one may not obtain benefits from a law while attacking
the constitutionality of a key provision.238 Consequently, Long Beach
could not obtain a federal charter under HOLA and then avoid its regu-
latory provisions. The Court reasoned that "[ilt would be intolerable
that the Congress should endow an association with the right to conduct
a public banking business on certain limitations and that the Court at the
behest of those who took advantage from the privilege should remove the
limitations intended for public protection. 2
39
The Supreme Court's decision, however, did not end the litigation, and
the Long Beach plaintiffs continued to contest the conservator's appoint-
ment. The Supreme Court had reversed the lower court's decision and
remanded the case.24 The lower court, however, read Fahey v. Mallonee
as allowing the plaintiffs to attack the conservatorship if they alleged
fraud by the FHLBB; the court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their
complaint accordingly, and the litigation continued. By contrast, Home
Loan Bank Board v. Mallonee24t interpreted Fahey v. Mallonee as requir-
ing the exhaustion of administrative proceedings2 42 available within the
FHLB system. Only after all such avenues were exhausted could a party
seek judicial review in the district courts. Because the plaintiffs had not
exhausted the proceedings available to them, the court found that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear the merits of the claims.243
The litigation, however, would not die, and surfaced again in Fahey v.
234. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. at 250.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 253-54.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 255 (citing United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1924)).
239. Id. at 256.
240. See id. at 248, 258.
241. 196 F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952 (1953).
242. "The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires not merely the
initiation of prescribed administrative procedures; it requires pursuing them to their ap-
propriate conclusion and awaiting their final outcome before seeking judicial interven-




O'Melveny & Myers.2' There, the plaintiffs appealed the award of in-
terim attorneys fees to the FHLBB. The Ninth Circuit, however, used
the case as an opportunity to define the nature of the S&L system created
by the New Deal legislation. The court reasoned that FHLBs do not
have "any sort of 'vested right' in [their own] continued existence or sta-
tus," and that "Congress, and not the courts, may continue or end the
[FHLB] System or any part of it; that Congress and not the courts may
direct how, where and when a Home Loan Bank is to function. " 245 Be-
cause the FHLB Act did not provide for a federal-court hearing on the
question of the dissolution of any FHLB, the lower court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction over indispensable par-
ties. 2' The circuit court therefore remanded the case to the lower court
with instructions to dismiss the action.
The Mallonee Litigation thus helped define the nature of the newly
created S&L system. The Ninth Circuit was able to dismiss many claims
on procedural grounds, however, and thus they never addressed some
questions that the case raised.2 47 Congress responded to those issues in
subsequent legislation.
B. Housing Act of 1954
1. Purpose
The Housing Act of 195424 was enacted to achieve three specific
goals. First, the Act sought to amend the National Housing Act of
1934,249 correcting "certain deficiencies and numerous obsolete and un-
necessary provisions. "25 Second, Congress wanted to advance its tradi-
tional goals of improving housing conditions and fostering home
ownership.2"' Congress' focus, however, shifted from avoiding foreclo-
sures, as in the 1930s, to preventing "the spread of blight into good areas
of the community" and rehabilitating "salvable" areas. 2  Finally, the
Act sought to spur the ecomony by combatting the effects of "no-build-
ing war years and.., the sharp increase in families enlarged by the baby
boom.""25
2. Structure and Powers
The Housing Act of 1954 contains three areas of particular interest:
244. 200 F.2d 420 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952 (1953).
245. Id. at 444 (emphasis in original).
246. See id. at 459 (emphasis added).
247. Specifically, the courts did not address the questions of personal jurisdiction over
Fahey or the propriety of appointing Ammann as conservator. See Home Loan Bank Bd.
v. Mallonee, 196 F.2d 336, 381 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952 (1953).
248. Ch. 649, 68 Stat. 590 (dispersed throughout Title 12 of the U.S.C.).
249. Ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934)(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq).
250. 100 Cong. Rec. 738 (1954)(President Eisenhower's letter to Congress).
251. See id.
252. Id. at 737.
253. 100 Cong. Rec. 739 (1954)(statement of Rep. Boiling).
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Title I, which amends the insurance powers created in the NHA; Title II,
which adds new provisions to the NHA; and Title V, which deals specifi-
cally with the FHLBB.
Title I of the Act prospectively limited the insurance coverage on
mortgages established under the N-A 251 to ninety percent of total as-
sets.255 In addition, Title I declared that the Commissioner of the FHA
could extend loans only to those projects that protected or improved the
livability of properties.2 56 Title I of the Act also modified some aspects of
the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund created under the NHA.257
Title II added new provisions to the NHA that dealt largely with slum
clearance and the housing shortage. Specifically, the Act supplemented
the mortgage insurance available through the MMIF for home improve-
ment and construction loans in low income areas.258 In addition, the
Commissioner was granted discretion to release parts of the mortgaged
property from the lien.259 To accomplish the goals of Title II, the Act
created a revolving fund of one million dollars. 6°
Title V promulgated new provisions and amendments relating to the
FHLBB.261 First, the Act addressed the issue of personal jurisdiction for
both the FHLBB262 and the FSLIC263 by clarifying the process-serving
mechanism. 26  The Act also limited the authority of courts to hear
claims involving FSLIC insurance payments:
No action against the Corporation to enforce a claim for payment of
254. See NHA, supra note 156, § 2, 48 Stat. 1246.
255. See Housing Act of 1954, supra note 248, § 101(a)(1), 68 Stat. 590.
256. See id. § 101(a)(2), 68 Stat. 590. Section 221(d) sets forth the specific eligibility
requirements for a home improvement loan. See id § 221(d), 68 Stat. at 600-01.
257. See Housing Act of 1954, supra note 248, § 111, 68 Stat. at 593.
258. See id. § 220(d)(1), 68 Stat. at 597.
259. See id. § 220(e), 68 Stat. at 597.
260. See id. § 220(g), 68 Stat. at 599.
261. The Committee on Banking and Currency noted that
[t]he Board presently has no means, except through the appointment of a con-
servator or receiver, to enforce the laws and regulations under which Federal
savings and loan associations operate. The bill would provide a method for the
enforcement of law and regulations without the necessity of the appointment of
a conservator or receiver, and would also establish standards and procedures for
the appointment of conservators and receivers.
S. Rep. No. 1472, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1954). Title V of the Act was thus intended to
provide the FHLBB with the additional, less drastic tools for handling unsound S&Ls.
See infra text accompanying notes 269-272 for a description of the additional procedures
created for unsound S&Ls.
262. See Housing Act of 1954, supra note 248, § 503(2), 68 Stat. at 634-35. See also
Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Mallonee, 196 F.2d 336, 365 (9th Cir. 1952)(acknowledging, but
failing to resolve, the question of personal jurisdiction over Fahey), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
952 (1953); Fahey v. O'Melveny & Myers, 200 F.2d 420, 459 (9th Cir. 1952)(holding that
the court lacked in personam jurisdiction over several indispensable parties, including
Fahey), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952 (1953).
263. See Housing Act of 1954, supra note 248, § 501(1), 68 Stat. at 633.
264. Process could be effected by serving any agent of the FHLBB or the FSLIC and




insurance upon an insured account of an insured institution in default
shall be brought after the expiration of three years from the date of
default unless, within such three-year period, the conservator, receiver,
or other legal custodian of the insured institution shall have recognized
such insured account as a valid claim against the insured institution
and the claim for payment of insurance shall have been presented to
the Corporation and its validity denied, in which event the action may
be brought within two years from the date of such denial.265
In addition, the Act also limited the FHLBB's power over state-
chartered S&Ls. Where the FHLBB determined that a state-chartered
S&L was unsound, the Act directed that it notify the responsible state
authority, which then had 120 days to correct the situation. If the au-
thority failed to do so, or if no such authority existed, the FHLBB then
had the power to terminate the S&L's insurance.216 This provision also
required that the FHLBB hold a hearing on the matter (in accordance
with the APA),267 and make a written report of its findings.2 68
If the S&L failed to correct its unsound condition even under the
threat of termination of the FSLIC coverage, the FHLBB still had the
power to appoint a conservator or receiver, but was required to appoint
the FSLIC for any federal S&L.2 69 The Act clearly stated, however, that
"no such appointment... shall be made except pursuant to a formal
resolution of the [FHLBB] stating the grounds therefor ... ."2" The
S&L simply had to be notified of a time and place for a hearing on the
proposed appointment. 1  If the administrative procedures were ex-
hausted, the FHLBB was subject to suit in a federal court on the ques-
tion of the appointment,27 2 thus addressing the issue of subject matter
265. Id. § 501(2), 68 Stat. at 633 (amending § 405 of the NHA).
266. See id. § 501(3), 68 Stat at 633-34.
267. See supra notes 201-209 and accompanying text.
268. See Housing Act of 1954, supra note 248, § 501(3), 68 Stat. at 633-34; see also
Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Mallonee, 196 F.2d 336, 341 n.2 & 350 (9th Cir. 1952)(the
FHLBB's order placing Long Beach under conservatorship did not state the reasons for
the decision; plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to hearing before an impartial tribunal
before action was taken), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952 (1953).
269. See Housing Act of 1954, supra note 248, § 503(2), 68 Stat. at 634-36 (amending
§ 5(d) of HOLA). The Act of 1954 also set forth the grounds for appointing a conservator
or receiver: insolvency, violation of law or regulation, concealment of its books or the
refusal to submit the books for inspection, and unsafe or unsound operation. See id.
270. Id. at 636. Section 503(2) also provided for a review of the appointment under
the process set forth in the APA. Id.
271. See id. § 503(2), 68 Stat. at 634-35. If the FHLBB determined that an emergency
existed, however, it was empowered to appoint a "Supervisory Representative" pending
the outcome of the hearing on the appointment of the conservator or receiver. See id. at
635. The Supervisory Representative was authorized to oversee the affairs of the S&L for
six months, or until sixty days after the end of litigation on the matter, whichever was
longer. See id. at 636.
272. See Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Mallonee, 196 F.2d 336, 355-56 (9th Cir. 1952)(in-
terpreting Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), as requiring exhaustion of administra-
tive proceedings before suit in federal court is proper), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952 (1953).
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jurisdiction raised in the Mallonee litigation.273
3. Reactive Theory
One Congressman admitted that the impetus for the passing the Act of
1954 was the Mallonee litigation:
[Tihe 1954 legislation was designed specifically with the Long Beach
Federal controversy in mind and in order to provide for administrative
procedures short of seizure action, so that solvent associations need
not bear such drastic penalties.... [W]e ha[d] the authority to go in
and appoint a conservator, and that seems to be a foolish thing to do if
the institution is solvent, and is merely guilty of violating the law or
some of the rules of the [FHLBB], and this will give us a practical
means of discussing and arbitrating and settling such disputes.274
Therefore, the Housing Act of 1954, like its predecessors, was a reactive
measure, relating to a past occurrence rather than to the future security
of the S&L industry.275
IV. 1960-1969
From 1960 to 1965, the economy continued to exhibit strength and
stability, growing at an average of $9.7 billion each quarter from 1960 to
1965. Output grew in real terms by more than twenty three percent and
unemployment fell to 4.5% by July of 1965.276 By 1966, however, seri-
ous problems had emerged in the S&L industry. 77 Commercial banks
began actively competing with S&Ls by offering high rates on certificates
of deposit, thereby diverting funds from S&Ls.27s As a result, there was
a "sharp curtailment of mortgage lending by the thrift institutions, which
in turn dragged down new housing starts." 279
The Federal Reserve, the FDIC and the FHLBB consequently coordi-
nated interest-rate ceilings on time deposits, thus decreasing competition
among the various components of the industry. ° By this time, how-
273. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
274. H.R. Rep. No. 2083, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1960)(statement of Rep. McAl-
lister) (footnote omitted).
275. The Long Beach plaintiffs tried to use the provisions of the Housing Act of 1954
to bolster their claims that the administrative proceedings under which Long Beach was
taken were inadequate. See Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco v. Hall, 225 F.2d
349, 360 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 968 (1956). Ironically, the Ninth Circuit
refused to apply the provisions of the Act-designed with the Mallonee litigation in
mind-because it interpreted the Act as having a prospective application only. See id. at
373-74.
276. See Fowler, Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination, in 1966 Savings and Loan
Annals 11-12.
277. Id. at 14.
278. See id. at 16.
279. Id.
280. See Interest Rate Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-597, 80 Stat. 823
(codified at various sections of 12 U.S.C.)(giving the FHLBB the authority to confer with
the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC in setting the interest rate on time deposits);
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ever, inflationary pressures were mounting,28' and a string of S&L fail-
ures ensued.2 82 The focus on the activities of financial institutions was
soon diverted, however. As the Hon. J.L. Robertson noted in his address
to Congress:
We are in the midst of... such important issues as the war in Viet-
nam, a soaring crime rate, the behavior of alienated young people, and
active dissatisfaction on the part of many Negro citizens. While we
face some difficult and complex problems in the area of bank supervi-
sion, they lack the drama inherent in these other issues.28 3
Consequently, S&L regulatory legislation during the 1960s was sparse.
A. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966
1. Purpose
The Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 ("FISA") 284 had
five goals. First, FISA sought to create an intermediate step between
determination of unsound practice in an S&L and the "drastic" steps of
either appointing a conservator or receiver or of terminating the FSLIC
coverage z.28  FISA thus provided the FHLBB with the supplemental
tool of cease-and-desist orders ("CDOs") to protect and regulate the
S&L industry.2 8 6 Second, Congress wanted to foster public confidence
and safeguard deposits by curtailing the FHLBB's ability to terminate
FSLIC coverage as a means of forcing compliance with FHLBB regula-
tions.287 Third, in order to decrease the potential for abuse of power,
Congress enacted FISA to strictly limit the ability to take over an associ-
ation or remove a director.288 Fourth, Congress enacted FISA to correct
the lack of uniformity of supervision between the state and federal S&L
systems. 2 8 9 One Congressman noted the danger of giving exclusive su-
pervisory power over state-chartered S&Ls to state agencies: a string of
failures in even a couple of states could drain the FSLIC and increase the
premiums assessed against other member institutions. 29° Finally, FISA
was passed to prevent groups of people from creating different combina-
tions of joint bank accounts, thereby obtaining more FSLIC coverage
W. Woerheide, The Savings and Loan Industry 139-144 (1984)(discussing the conse-
quences of interest-rate ceilings).
281. See F. Mishkin, The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets 216-
17 (1986).
282. See Bartell, An Analysis of Illinois Savings and Loan Associations Which Failed in
the Period 1963-1968, in Study of the Savings and Loan Industry 345-436 (Federal Home
Loan Bank Board 1969).
283. 114 Cong. Rec. 29,210 (1968).
284. Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028 (codified at various sections of 12 U.S.C.).
285. See S. Rep. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3532, 3537.
286. See id. at 3541.
287. See 112 Cong. Rec. 24,983-84 (1966) (statement of Rep. Patman).
288. See id. at 25,524.




than was actually granted by law.2 91
2. Structure and Powers
FISA provided that if the FHLBB found an S&L to be engaging in
unsound practices likely to result in "insolvency ... or substantial dis-
sipation of assets ... or ... to otherwise seriously prejudice the interests
of its savings account holders, the [FHLBB] may issue a temporary order
requiring the association to cease and desist any such violation or prac-
tice. '292 The temporary CDO was effective upon service and lasted until
the FHLBB had made a final ruling on the charges.293 The FHLBB
could apply to a federal district court to force the S&L to comply with
the temporary CDO.294
Additionally, once the FHLBB determined at a hearing that the S&L
was engaging in unsound practices, FISA authorized the FHLBB to is-
sue a permanent CDO.295 Moreover, FISA authorized the FHLBB to
serve notice of its intention to suspend any officer(s) who violated a
CDO, engaged in unsound practices or were considered personally dis-
honest.296 The suspension was effective upon notice and remained effec-
tive pending the outcome of an administrative proceeding on the
subject.2 97 Furthermore, any officer charged with a felony could be sus-
pended or prohibited from any further S&L management; even if the of-
ficer was acquitted, the FHLBB could still institute proceedings for
removal.2 98
If the S&L failed to comply with the terms of the CDO, FISA allowed
the FHLBB to appoint a conservator or receiver ex parte.299 The S&L
then had thirty days to bring an action in federal district court to request
the removal of the conservator or receiver. FISA directed the courts to
give priority to these cases and to expedite matters as much as possi-
ble." m If the conservator or receiver was validly appointed, the court
lacked authority to constrain his powers to act as a director for the
291. See id. at 26,472 (statement of Rep. Robertson).
292. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 [hereinafter FISA], Pub. L. No.
89-695, § 101(a), 80 Stat 1028-30 (adding § 5(d)(3)(A) to HOLA).
293. See id.
294. See id. (adding § 5(d)(3)(C) to HOLA).
295. See id. (adding § 5(d)(2)(A) & (B) to HOLA). "[Tihe new cease and desist au-
thority in title I is entirely adequate to deal with any liquidity, reserves, conflict of inter-
est, or other serious supervisory problem that might arise." 112 Cong. Rec. 24,985
(1966)(statement of Rep. Patman).
296. See FISA, supra note 292, § 101(a), 80 Stat. at 1030-31 (adding § 5(d)(4)(A)-(D)
to HOLA).
297. See id.
298. See id. (adding § 5(d)(5)(A) to HOLA).
299. See id. (adding § 5(d)(6)(A) to HOLA). The grounds listed for appointment of a
conservator or receiver were insolvency, substantial dissipation of assets, unsound condi-
tion, willful violation of a CDO or concealment of books. See id.




S&L.3"1 Moreover, FISA amended the N-A to grant CDO powers to
the FSLIC that were similar to those described above.3°2
Title IV of FISA provided that the Act was effective only until June
30, 1972.303 The time limit was included because-in light of the new
rules for federal and state S&L receiverships and conservatorships-
FISA would have a major impact on both federal regulators and individ-
ual S&Ls.3'4 The expiration date would thus give Congress a chance to
"work out any kinks" in the system that might surface after FISA was
put into widespread effect.305
3. Reactive Theory
FISA also conforms to the reactive nature of the S&L regulatory legis-
lation. The Act was first developed to satisfy S&L trade associations and
regulators3°6 who demanded legislation that would "deal with the hand-
ful of financial institutions whose conduct might reflect unfavorably on
the vast majority of the soundly operated savings and loan associa-
tions."'3 7 FISA was therefore enacted specifically because of the diffi-
culty the FHLBB had experienced in obtaining the obedience of only a
few delinquent S&Ls. 30 8 FISA thus overhauled the disciplinary structure
created under HOLA and NHA, partially because the regulators could
not effectively control isolated incidents.3" 9
B. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967
1. Purpose
The Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967311
301. See id. (adding § 5(d)(6)(C) and (D) to HOLA).
302. See id. § 102, 80 Stat. at 1036-37 (amending § 407 of the NHA).
303. See id. § 401, 80 Stat. at 1056.
304. See 112 Cong. Rec. 25,524 (1966) (statement of Sen. Robertson).
305. Id. at 24,985 (statement of Rep. Patman).
306. See id. at 20,078 (statement of Rep. Proxmire).
307. Id. at 20,079 (letter to Sen. Proxmire) (emphasis added).
308. See Baxter, Life in the Administrative Track" Administrative Adjudication of
Claims Against Savings Institution Receiverships, 1988 Duke L. J. 422, 484 (1988).
309. See 112 Cong. Rec. 20,078 (1966) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
310. Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82 Stat. 5 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1730a). Hold-
ing companies are "corporations which own more than 25 percent of the stock of two or
more [institutions]." 113 Cong. Rec. 6609 (1967) (statement of Rep. Mills).
Congress enacted the original S&L Holding Company Act in 1959, adding Section 408
to the NHA to regulate the activities of holding companies. See Pub. L. No. 86-374, 73
Stat. 691 (1959). Under the Act, a company had "control" over an S&L if it owned
more than 10% of the institution's stock. See id. § 408 (a)(3), 73 Stat. 691-92. The Act
required the FSLIC to reject any insurance application if the applicant was controlled by
a holding company, if such company already controlled an insured S&L See id. § 408
(b)(1), 73 Stat. at 692. Moreover, if the FSLIC discovered that an institution was con-
trolled by a holding company, it had the authority to terminate insurance coverage or to
order a sale of stock to bring ownership below the 10% limit. See id. § 408(b)(2)(A)&(B),
73 Stat. at 692. If a holding company refused to divest itself of its holdings, the FSLIC
could enforce divestiture through the federal district courts. See id. § 408(e), 73 Stat. at
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were enacted to achieve three main goals. First, the Act sought to create
a comprehensive regulatory scheme for S&L holding companies where
those companies held federally insured S&Ls.31 1 Congress thus hoped to
foster the responsible use of holding companies as a financing device.
3 1 2
Second, the Act sought to curtail the opportunity for abuse while simul-
taneously maintaining enough freedom to foster normal business transac-
tions between the holding companies and their subsidiaries.3" 3 Third,
bank holding company debt had been structured to pressure the insured
subsidiary associations "to maximize earnings and dividends to meet the
parent's debt service.''311 That, in turn, induced the subsidiaries to make
risky investments, which endangered both the FSLIC and member as-
sociations. Congress enacted the Amendments to prevent this "top-
heavy" debt structure.315
2. Structure and Powers
The Amendments of 1967 revised the NHA to encompass bank hold-
ing companies,31 6 requiring that each company register with the FHLBB,
maintain books and records in accordance with the FSLIC regulations,
and agree to periodic examinations.31 7 In addition, the Amendments
listed those activities forbidden to bank holding companies and subsidi-
ary S&Ls.
First, the Amendments prohibited holding companies from conducting
any activities that would evade restrictions placed on a subsidiary
S&L.3 1 The Amendments restricted S&L holding companies to only the
following activities: participating in the management of S&Ls, con-
ducting an insurance business, managing or liquidating assets or proper-
ties, acting as a trustee, or engaging in any other service that the FSLIC
determined was appropriate.31 9 Second, the Amendments proscribed the
following activities by subsidiary S&Ls: investing in an affiliate; purchas-
ing securities from an affiliate; making loans to an affiliate; making loans
secured by the property of an affiliate; making loans with knowledge that
the proceeds will be paid to the affiliate; and guaranteeing a loan of an
692. Finally, the Act required a study on the nature and growth of the holding company
industry, as well as a comment on the prospects for the future of the industry. See id.
§ 408(g)(2), 73 Stat. at 693.
311. See H.R. Rep. No. 997, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1601, 1603.
312. See id., reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 1617.
313. See id., reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 1603.
314. Id., reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 1604.
315. See id.
316. See Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, supra note 310,
§ 2, 82 Stat. 5.
317. See id. (amending § 408(b) of the NHA).





The Amendments also placed general restrictions on individuals and
corporations that participated in the bank holding company business.
The Amendments made it unlawful for one to acquire an interest in a
bank holding company or an S&L where he would thereby gain complete
or virtually complete control in the enterprise, unless he had obtained
approval from the FSLIC.321  Furthermore, the Amendments made it
illegal to establish an interstate bank holding company, or for existing
companies to acquire or establish headquarters and subsidiary S&Ls in
different states.322
Finally, the Amendments granted additional powers to the FSLIC to
issue rules and regulations governing the bank holding company busi-
ness.323 First, the FSLIC was authorized to prohibit any acquisition that
tended to create a monopoly or decrease competition in the industry,
regardless of the size of the acquisition.324 Second, the Amendments em-
powered the FSLIC to conduct any investigation it deemed necessary to
ascertain compliance with the Amendments and its own rules and regu-
lations.325 Where the FSLIC found a violation, it was authorized to
bring an action in federal district court to enjoin the violation of the pro-
visions, rules or regulations 6.3 2  Finally, individuals who willfully vio-
lated the provisions of the Amendments were subject to fines,
imprisonment or both.327
3. Reactive Theory
True to form, Congress continued its reactive policymaking in 1967.
First, through the Amendments, Congress responded to the demands of
trade groups such as the United States League of Savings Associations.
Since 1965, the League had been proposing changes in the holding com-
pany laws, and virtually all of their suggestions can be found in the 1967
Amendments.328
320. See Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, supra note 310,
§ 2, 82 Stat. at 8-12 (amending § 408(d) of the NHA).
321. See id. (amending § 408(e)(1)(A)(ii) of the NHA).
322. See id. (amending § 408(e)(3) of the NHA). This section provided an exception
for S&Ls acquired through pledge or hypothecation. See id.
323. See id. (amending § 408(h)(1) of the NHA).
324. See id. (amending § 408(e)(2)(A) of the NHA).
325. See Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, supra note 310,
§ 2, 82 Stat. at 12-15 (amending § 408(h)(2) of the NHA).
326. See id. (amending § 408(h)(4) of the NHA). The Amendments also allowed the
parties to appeal any such order to the federal Circuit Court. See id. (amending § 408(k)
of the NHA).
327. See id. (amending § 4080)(2) & (3) of the NHA).
328. See United States League of Savings Associations, 1965 Savings and Loan Annals
361. The League stated that
careful consideration should be given to assure inclusion of the following fea-
tures in such legislation: (1) Provision for the regulation and examination of
holding companies and their affiliates, to preclude them from activities which
are prohibited to insured institutions which they control. (2) Prohibition from
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Second, the S&L industry's competition with banks sparked the reali-
zation that S&Ls were no longer an isolated industry, but rather, a re-
sponsive part of the money market.3 29 Consequently, "the real question
this legislation raised... was not one of merely extending Home Loan
Bank Board jurisdiction over the activities of the savings and loan hold-
ing companies, but the broader and more important question of what
competitive devices are needed and will be needed to strengthen the thrift
industry. '33 1 In short, this legislation was the vehicle for S&Ls to return
to the competitive market of 1967 to 1968 after the hard times of 1966.
C. Bank Protection Act of 1968
1. Purpose
By 1968, Congress had finally realized that past S&L legislation had
created the "accidental and irrational system of bank regulation and su-
pervision [with which] this country has been saddled .... ,,331 It is
fitting, then, that the last piece of S&L legislation examined in this Note,
the Bank Protection Act of 1968,32 was intended to correct some of the
system's existing deficiencies.
First, in response to the divergent policies of state and federal regula-
tory agencies, this Act sought to consolidate the actions of state and fed-
eral agencies regarding receiverships and liquidations.33 Furthermore,
the Act limited the overlap of the various federal agencies that exercised
receivership and liquidation powers.334 Additionally, the Act responded
acquiring or retaining the control of insured institutions in more than one state.
(3) Restriction of business dealings of holding companies and their affiliates
with the insured institutions which they control.... (5) Prohibition of an of-
ficer, director or owner of substantial interest in a holding company from ac-
quiring or retaining for more than three years the control of any insured
institution which is not otherwise controlled by the holding company.
Id.; see also United States League of Savings Associations, 1966 Savings and Loan Annals
295 (reiterating the suggestions for the Holding Company Amendments).
329. See H.R. Rep. No. 997, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1601, 1616 (supplemental views of Rep. Hanna); see also 113 Cong.
Rec. 17,369 (1967) (statement of Sen. Sparkman)(of the associations in financial diffi-
culty, 63% of the assets were held by bank holding companies even though they consti-
tuted only 12% of the industry in 1966).
330. H.R. Rep. No. 997, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 1616-17 (emphasis added).
331. 114 Cong. Rec. 29,209 (1968)(address by Hon. J.L. Robertson)(emphases added).
332. Pub. L. No. 90-389, 82 Stat. 294 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1729).
333. The Act "was effected against a background of obstruction on the part of the
Illinois authorities, who had refused to appoint the FSLIC as receiver in four cases even
though the FSLIC was the insurer of deposits in those thrifts and by far the major credi-
tor." Baxter, supra note 308, at 486. See also 114 Cong. Rec. 29,208 (1968)(statement of
Rep. Patman)(the fact that federal and state agencies "have not always been in step with
each other has been a source of considerable concern both to the regulators and to those
regulated. For a time it became the focus of attention, virtually to the exclusion of every-
thing else.").
334. See 114 Cong. Rec. 29,209 (1968) (statement of Rep. Patman) ("During the past
five years the delicate balance of the banking industry has been upset, the dual banking
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to an increase in bank robberies in the mid-1960s by mandating increased
protective measures.335
2. Structure and Powers
The Bank Protection Act mandated the appointment of the FSLIC as
the sole receiver or conservator of any insured, state-chartered S&L
where (1) appointment by the state authority had been outstanding for
fifteen consecutive days or where the S&L had been closed under the
laws of the state;3 36 or (2) one of the grounds enumerated in HOLA337
for the appointment of a receiver or conservator existed.338
Once the FSLIC was appointed, the Act gave the FSLIC the same
powers it exercised over federal S&Ls under receivership or conservator-
ship.339 Moreover, the Act gave the FSLIC the power to liquidate an
insured, state-chartered institution where it deemed the action neces-
sary.' Finally, the Act gave the federal supervisory agencies discretion
in the area of bank protection. Congress simply directed the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC and the FHLBB
to issue rules outlining the steps financial institutions must take with re-
spect to the installation and operation of security devices and
procedures.3
By the end of 1969, unemployment was at 3.5%"2 and the economy
system endangered, and the development of banking on sound lines impeded by the diver-
gent policies, procedures and interpretations emanating from the three federal supervi-
sory agencies.").
335. See id. at 11,804 (statement of Rep. Patman)("[R]obberies of banks have in-
creased 154 percent over the level of 1960 .... Between 1963 and 1967, violations of the
Federal bank robbery statute rose from 1,548 to an all-time high of 2,551"); id. at 11,806
(letter of Byron Dunn)(discussing the deaths of law enforcement officers and bankers); id.
at 11,808 (statement of Rep. Fascell)(noting "a tendency in bank architecture that places
more value on comfort and convenience than on safety. Concomitant with these trends,
we find a serious deficiency of protective equipment in a great number of our banking
institutions.").
336. See Bank Protection Act of 1968, supra note 332, § 6, 82 Stat. at 295 (amending
§ 406(c)(2)(A) of the NHA).
337. See supra note 302 (FISA's amendments to HOLA enumerating these grounds).
338. See Bank Protection Act of 1968, supra note 332, § 6, 82 Stat. at 295 (amending
§ 406(c)(2)(B) of the NHA). In Biscayne Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan
Bank Bd., 720 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984), the
court held that the FHLBB need only have a reasonable belief that a statutory ground for
receivership or conservatorship (outlined in HOLA) exists. Once a court determines that
the FHLBB acted reasonably, the court may not second-guess the FHLBB's judgment,
since the discretion to appoint a receiver or conservator has been delegated by statute to
the FHLBB. See id. at 1503, 1505. Using the same reasoning, the court also rejected the
plaintiffs' request for a "less drastic" remedy under the Bank Protection Act. See id. at
1505.
339. See Bank Protection Act of 1968, supra note 332, § 6, 82 Stat. at 295-96 (amend-
ing § 406(c)(3)(A) of the NHA).
340. See id. (amending § 406(c)(3)(B) of the NHA).
341. See id. § 3(a), 82 Stat. at 295.




had grown by 2.8%. 3 13 The Gross National Product was $932.3 bil-
lion,3" national income was $771.2 billion34 5 and personal savings were
$37.6 billion. 3 6 The nation's S&L industry, armed with the regulations
described above, entered the 1970s unaware of the troubles that lay
ahead.
CONCLUSION
The S&L regulatory legislation has generally been reactive, and while
it helped develop the industry, it did so at a staggered pace. Congress
continued to amend S&L legislation-even amending amendments-al-
most always in response to immediate conditions. Consequently, the
S&L regulations, as they developed up to 1969, lacked the consonance
required for a stable and strong S&L industry. FIRREA is certainly a
comprehensive piece of legislation, but it is nonetheless built on the foun-
dation created from the 1930s to the 1960s. Moreover, it is a reaction to
the string of S&L failures experienced during the latter half of the 1980s.
Does that mean that the "bailout bill" is doomed? Is a collapse of the
commercial banking industry on the horizon? While no one can predict
the future, the Little Dutch Boy was a courageous figure, and he was still
no match for the crumbling dam and the floodwaters that lay behind it.
Lucia J. Mandarino
343. See id. at 313.
344. See id. at 311.
345. See id. at 315.
346. See id. at 313.
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